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1. Introduction
The important role played in the world economy by GATT (and now its succes-
sor, the WTO) is widely accepted. Since its creation in 1947, GATT has grown
in membership from an initial set of 23 countries to a roster that now exceeds
125 countries. The expanding GATT membership reflects the success that this
organization has had in facilitating tariﬀ reductions. Through the 8 rounds of
trade-policy negotiations that have been sponsored by GATT, the average ad val-
orem tariﬀ on industrial goods has fallen from over 40% to below 4%. In light
of the significant impact that GATT has had on the world economy, it is there-
fore important to assess the progress that has been made toward providing a
theoretical interpretation of GATT and its main features.
While the past success of GATT justifies in its own right a theoretical inter-
pretation of its main features, this task is perhaps even more important when
the future of this multilateral institution is considered. A critical question in the
coming years is whether the same set of principles on which post-war multilat-
eral liberalization has been based can or should be applied under the WTO to
a host of “new” trade-policy issues. These issues include the spread of preferen-
tial trading agreements, the treatment of labor and environmental standards, the
subsidization of agricultural exports, the harmonization of competition policies,
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and the treatment of services, foreign direct investment and intellectual property.
An understanding of why GATT’s principles have worked well in the more tra-
ditional arena of multilateral tariﬀ liberalization for industrial goods can lay the
foundation for answers to this critical question.
In this paper, we present research that speaks to the purpose and design
of GATT. The paper proceeds in three basic steps. We first discuss the major
theoretical approaches to the study of trade agreements. Next, we develop the
institutional context for our study with a description of the history and design of
GATT and the WTO. Finally, we draw on the theoretical literature in order to
interpret and evaluate the institutional design of GATT.
We begin in Section 2 with a review of the major theoretical approaches to
trade agreements. We organize this discussion around a simple but basic question:
What is the purpose of a trade agreement? In asking this question, we seek a
“problem” that would arise for governments in the absence of a trade agreement
and that could be “solved” with the creation of an appropriate trade agreement.
Suppose, for example, that in the absence of a trade agreement governments would
set their policies in a unilateral fashion. The creation of a trade agreement is then
potentially appealing to governments provided that an ineﬃciency (relative to
governments’ preferences) exists when trade policies are set unilaterally. Once
the ineﬃciency is identified, the purpose of a trade agreement can be understood
as an attempt to “undo” the ineﬃcient behavior that arises under unilateral tariﬀ
setting, so that all member governments may thereby enjoy higher welfare.
Our review of the theoretical literature suggests that there are two kinds of
problems that a trade agreement might solve. The first possibility is that the
trade-policy decisions of one government give rise to an externality that aﬀects
the welfare of another government. This is the possibility that is emphasized in
the traditional economic approach to trade agreements. Under this approach, a
government (of a large country) is assumed to set its import tariﬀ in order to
maximize national welfare, while recognizing that some of the burden of the tariﬀ
falls upon foreign exporters, whose products sell at a lower world price (i.e., at
a diminished terms of trade). This “terms-of-trade externality” naturally leads
governments to set unilateral tariﬀs that are higher than would be eﬃcient. The
purpose of a trade agreement is then to eliminate the terms-of-trade-driven re-
strictions in trade volume that arise when policies are set unilaterally, and thereby
oﬀer governments a means of escape from a Prisoners’ Dilemma.1
1The terms-of-trade externality is not the only possible “cross-border” externality, but it is
the externality that has figured most prominently in the theoretical literature. For example,
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An apparent weakness of the traditional approach is the seemingly unrealistic
hypothesis that governments maximize national welfare. Real-world governments,
after all, have both political and economic motivations. It is thus important
to assess whether the purpose of trade agreements identified by the traditional
approach is in any sense tied to the hypothesis of national-welfare maximization.
To explore this issue, we follow the recent political-economy literature and allow
that governments are also concerned with the distributional consequences of their
tariﬀ choices. We refer to this generalization of the traditional approach as the
political-economy approach to trade agreements. While the inclusion of political
concerns enhances the realism of the model, we show that it does not oﬀer any
separate purpose for trade agreements. Whether or not governments have political
motivations, it is their ability to shift the costs of protection onto one another
through terms-of-trade movements that creates an ineﬃciency when tariﬀs are
selected unilaterally. In both the traditional and political-economy approaches to
trade agreements, therefore, the purpose of a trade agreement is to oﬀer a means
of escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma.
A second kind of problem for a trade agreement to solve arises when a gov-
ernment is unable to make credible commitments to its own private sector. A
government, for example, may wish to commit that in the future it will not pro-
tect a certain industry, or that it will undertake extensive regulatory reforms. Such
a commitment is potentially valuable to the government, since it induces behavior
(for instance, investments in cost reduction or in export sectors) from the private
sector that the government finds desirable. The problem in this case is that if the
private sector does not respond in the desired fashion, then it may not be credible
for the government to follow through on its proposed plan. A trade agreement can
potentially help a government solve its time-consistency problem, if the agreement
enhances the credibility of the government’s plan, by calling for some form of re-
taliation in the event that the plan is not executed. The commitment approach to
trade agreements thus identifies a distinct problem for a trade agreement to solve;
an “environmental externality” can arise if the trade-policy decisions of one government aﬀect
production decisions that in turn alter the environment and thereby the welfare of a trading
partner. See also Flam and Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989), who point
out that unilateral tariﬀ choices can be ineﬃcient in the presence of monopolistic competition,
even in the absence of terms-of-trade movements. Further, as Ethier (1998a, 1998b) argues, a
“scale externality” may arise if production technologies exhibit international increasing returns
to scale, in which case the value of a trade agreement to one government can be influenced by
the volume of trade between other countries. Finally, Ethier (2000) considers the possibility of
a “political externality” across countries.
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however, the application of this approach to the study of GATT’s institutional de-
sign is not yet well developed. While we describe recent insights that emerge from
the application of the commitment approach, our primary emphasis is therefore
directed toward the traditional economic and political-economy approaches.
The traditional and political-economy approaches indicate that a trade agree-
ment can increase the welfare of member governments, if the agreement undoes
the ineﬃcient restrictions in trade volume that arise in the absence of an agree-
ment. Governments can thus jointly benefit from a trade agreement that calls
for a mutual reduction in the levels of protection. But this perspective raises a
pair of further questions. First, how should the institution through which govern-
ments negotiate over trade policies be designed? Following the legal literature,
we draw a distinction between “power-based” and “rules-based” approaches to
trade negotiations. In a power-based arrangement, governments negotiate over
tariﬀs in a fashion that is unconstrained by any previously agreed-upon rules of
negotiation. The respective bargaining powers of the negotiating governments is
then an important determinant of the eventual tariﬀ-negotiation outcome. By
contrast, under a rules-based approach, the governments agree upon a set of rules
or principles by which subsequent tariﬀ negotiations must abide. In this case,
power asymmetries between governments can be expected to play a diminished
role in trade-policy negotiations. We develop this distinction further in Section 2.
Second, how is the trade agreement to be enforced? Enforcement is an im-
portant concern, since each government has a short-term incentive to deviate to
a higher-than-is-eﬃcient tariﬀ, in order to obtain the consequent terms-of-trade
gains. Governments are dissuaded from such opportunistic behavior only if the
pursuit of short-term gains results in long-term losses, as when other governments
retaliate in kind. Viewed in this way, it is clear that the tariﬀs that govern-
ments can achieve as part of a “self-enforcing” trade agreement reflect a balance
between the short-term gains from protection and the long-term losses from re-
taliation. While the “most-cooperative” tariﬀs that governments can enforce are
more eﬃcient than the tariﬀs that would occur in the absence of an agreement,
they may not be fully eﬃcient. In Section 2, we draw on the literature that di-
rectly addresses the enforcement of trade agreements and argue that a meaningful
agreement must constitute an equilibrium of a repeated trade-policy game.
In Section 3, we turn to the second step of the paper and describe the origin
and design of GATT and the WTO. We note that the origin of GATT can be
traced to the disastrous economic performance that accompanied the high tariﬀs
of the 1920’s and 1930’s. The design of GATT is rules-based: GATT members
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accept a set of rules or principles that describe the manner in which any subsequent
trade-policy negotiations may proceed. The primary enforcement task of GATT
is then to ensure compliance with these rules. While there are a large number
of specific articles in GATT, it is widely accepted that the pillars of the GATT
approach are the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN).
Broadly speaking, mutual adjustments in trade policy conform to the principle
of reciprocity if these policy adjustments bring about changes in the volume of
each country’s imports that are of equal value to changes in the volume of its
exports. This principle arises as a norm of behavior when governments negotiate
tariﬀ reductions (i.e., “concessions”) in a GATT round, as it has been observed
that governments seek to achieve a “balance of concessions” in these negotiations.
The principle of reciprocity also appears as an explicit GATT rule when trading
partners meet to renegotiate tariﬀs to higher levels. In this case, when one govern-
ment withdraws a concession to which it had previously agreed, its trading partner
is allowed under GATT rules to withdraw a “substantially equivalent concession”
of its own. The principle of non-discrimination is a GATT rule that requires that
the import tariﬀ selected by a government on a particular good cannot be higher
for the exports of one GATT member than for those of another.
With the creation of GATT, governments therefore constructed a rather elabo-
rate set of rules with which to address their perceived trade-policy problems. But
do these rules reflect an underlying economic logic? It is tempting to conclude
that they do not. Putting aside the terms-of-trade externality mentioned above,
standard economic theory holds that the optimal unilateral policy for a national-
welfare maximizing government is free trade. From this perspective, the emphasis
placed on reciprocity in GATT is surely mysterious. Why would one government
be willing to help itself with a tariﬀ reduction only if its trading partner made a
similar “concession?” Indeed, according to standard economic reasoning, GATT
should not exist, and so any attempt to oﬀer an “economic” interpretation of
GATT is destined for failure. This view is regularly advanced, but it is perhaps
stated most eloquently in Krugman’s (1991, pp. 25-27) writings:2
“There is no generally accepted label for the theoretical underpinnings of the GATT.
I like to refer to it as ‘GATT-think’ — a simple set of principles that is entirely con-
sistent, explains most of what goes on in negotiations, but makes no sense in terms of
economics...The reason why GATT-think works is, instead, that it captures some basic
realities of the political process.”
2See also Krugman (1997).
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By contrast, in what constitutes the third step of this paper, we review a liter-
ature that suggests that GATT does, in fact, make economic sense. This litera-
ture places the terms-of-trade externality at center stage, and argues that GATT
may be understood as an institution whose central features assist governments -
whether politically motivated or not - as they attempt to escape from a terms-of-
trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma.
We develop this argument in Sections 4 through 6, where we present various
extensions of the traditional terms-of-trade model of trade agreements and inter-
pret and evaluate GATT rules in the context of these extended models. We ask
positive questions: Can GATT rules be understood as the means through which
governments solve their terms-of-trade problem? Do the predictions that come
from this perspective conform with GATT experience? And we also ask normative
questions: If the terms-of-trade problem does account for the purpose of GATT,
are the rules of GATT properly designed?
We begin the third step of the paper in Section 4, where we consider in some
detail the principle of reciprocity. We then turn in Section 5 to the other pillar
of the GATT system and analyze the principle of non-discrimination. As we dis-
cuss in these sections, it is possible to understand reciprocity as a principle that
“neutralizes” all externalities that travel through world prices, while the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination then ensures that no other trade-policy externalities
arise across trading partners. Reciprocity and non-discrimination thereby serve as
complementary principles that assist governments in their bilateral negotiations
to achieve more eﬃcient trade-policy outcomes. These principles have as well a
virtuous property when the welfare of non-participants is considered: together,
reciprocity and non-discrimination ensure that a bilateral negotiation between
trading partners does not alter the welfare of the government of a third country.
Reciprocity and non-discrimination thus limit the ability of negotiating partners
to appropriate the welfare of non-participants. By the same logic, the “free-rider”
problem that is often associated with the principle of non-discrimination can be
eliminated if negotiations also abide by the principle of reciprocity.
In line with the abstract discussion of power-based and rules-based approaches
to trade-policy negotiations, we suggest further that the specific rules of reci-
procity and non-discrimination diminish the extent to which power asymmetries
across countries influence trade-policy outcomes. More speculatively, we argue
that the decision by governments to form a rules-based institution may have been
motivated in part by a desire to encourage the participation of “weaker” coun-
tries. Recognizing that the governments of smaller countries might fear that they
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would eventually be “held up” at the bargaining table, the governments of pow-
erful countries (i.e., the U.S. and Great Britain) eﬀectively committed with a
rules-based system not to exploit their weaker trading partners. From this per-
spective, the selection of a rules-based approach solved a commitment problem
(across countries) that ensured participation, while the specific rules employed
within this approach then served to solve the terms-of-trade problem.
We return to the topic of enforcement in Section 6. There, we note that the
balance between the short-term incentive to protect and the long-term fear of re-
taliation can be altered when the trading environment changes; as a consequence,
the most-cooperative tariﬀs that can be enforced may vary with underlying mar-
ket conditions. Expanding on this basic viewpoint, we oﬀer interpretations of
some GATT rules and experiences. For example, we interpret the GATT escape
clause, under which a government can temporarily raise its tariﬀ if it faces a surge
in imports, as a safeguard provision that works to maintain cooperation within
a self-enforcing agreement when the market environment is volatile. We also de-
scribe work that emphasizes enforcement limitations and interprets the gradual
manner in which tariﬀs have been liberalized over GATT’s five-decades of history.
We conclude in Section 7. Here, we summarize the main lessons developed
in the paper. We also present and evaluate some of the objections that have
been raised against the terms-of-trade approach. In addition, we discuss how
the traditional terms-of-trade model has been extended to study new trade-policy
issues that currently face the WTO, and we propose directions for future research.
2. The Theory of Trade Agreements
Any theory of trade agreements must provide a reason for a trade agreement to
exist. We thus begin by examining the purposes for trade agreements that are
proposed in the literature. We also introduce in this section two additional issues
to which we return in greater depth later in the paper. First, we consider the
broad manner in which governments might design a trade agreement, and we
distinguish between power- and rules-based approaches. Second, we consider the
means through which a trade agreement might be enforced.
2.1. The Purpose of Trade Agreements
We begin, then, with the most basic question: What is the purpose of a trade
agreement? In this subsection, we develop the answers to this question that are
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oﬀered by the three major theoretical approaches to the study of trade agree-
ments. We first discuss the traditional economic approach, in which governments
are assumed to set tariﬀs so as to manipulate their terms of trade with the ob-
jective of maximizing national welfare. Next, we consider the political-economy
approach, wherein governments are assumed to also place emphasis on the distri-
butional consequences of their tariﬀ choices. The final approach that we describe
is the commitment approach, which stresses the diﬃculty governments may face
in making policy commitments to the private sector.
To facilitate comparison of the three approaches, we develop each approach
in the context of a unified model of the underlying economic environment. In
particular, we employ throughout a standard two-good general equilibrium model
of trade between two countries. This model of the world economy is familiar,
being analogous to those that can be found in any undergraduate international
economics textbook. With the underlying economic environment captured in this
fashion, we are then able to direct attention to the essential diﬀerence between
the three approaches, namely, the modeling of government preferences. We begin
by reviewing the general equilibrium model.
2.1.1. The General Equilibrium Model
The standard general equilibrium model of trade consists of two countries, home
(no *) and foreign (*), that trade two goods which are normal goods in con-
sumption and produced in perfectly competitive markets under conditions of in-
creasing opportunity costs. Let x(y) be the natural import good of the home
(foreign) country, and define p ≡ px/py (p∗ ≡ p∗x/p∗y) to be the local relative price
facing home (foreign) producers and consumers. The home (foreign) ad valorem
import tariﬀ is denoted as t (t∗), and we assume throughout that this tariﬀ is
not prohibitive. Defining τ ≡ (1 + t) and τ∗ ≡ (1 + t∗), it then follows that
p = τpw ≡ p(τ , pw) and p∗ = pw/τ ∗ ≡ p∗(τ ∗, pw), where pw ≡ p∗x/py is the “world”
(i.e., untaxed) relative price. The foreign (domestic) terms of trade is then given
by pw (1/pw), and we interpret τ > 1 (τ < 1) to be an import tax (import subsidy)
and similarly for τ∗.3
Within each country, production occurs at the point on the production pos-
sibilities frontier at which the marginal rate of transformation between x and y
is equal to the local relative price. This allows domestic and foreign production
3Under the Lerner symmetry theorem, trade taxes and subsidies can be equivalently depicted
as applying to exports or imports in this two-sector general equilibrium setting.
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functions to be represented as Qi = Qi(p) and Q∗i = Q
∗
i (p
∗) for i = {x, y}. Con-
sumption is determined by the local relative price, which defines the trade-oﬀ
faced by consumers and implies the level and distribution of factor income in the
economy, and by tariﬀ revenue R (R∗), which is distributed lump-sum to domestic
(foreign) consumers and measured in units of the local export good at local prices.




∗, R∗) for i = {x, y}, where tariﬀ revenue is defined implicitly by
R = [Dx(p,R)−Qx(p)][p− pw] or R = R(p, pw) for the domestic country and by
R∗ = [D∗y(p
∗, R∗)−Q∗y(p∗)][1/p∗−1/pw] or R∗ = R∗(p∗, pw) for the foreign country.
Given the assumption that goods are normal, each country’s tariﬀ revenue is an
increasing function of its terms of trade. With tariﬀ revenue now expressed as a
function of local and world prices, national consumption in each country may be
written as Ci(p, pw) ≡ Di(p,R(p, pw)) and C∗i (p∗, pw) ≡ D∗i (p∗, R∗(p∗, pw)).
We next introduce notation for imports and exports, so that the trade balance
and equilibrium conditions may be expressed. For the home country, imports of x
are denoted as Mx(p(τ , pw), pw) ≡ Cx(p(τ , pw), pw)−Qx(p(τ , pw)) and exports of
y are represented as Ey(p(τ , pw), pw) ≡ Qy(p(τ , pw))− Cy(p(τ , pw), pw), where we
now make explicit the dependence of the local price upon the tariﬀ and the world
price. Similarly, for the foreign country, we denote imports of y and exports of
x as M∗y (p
∗(τ ∗, pw), pw) and E∗x(p
∗(τ∗, pw), pw), respectively. For any world price,
home and foreign budget constraints imply that trade is balanced:
pwMx(p(τ , p
w), pw) = Ey(p(τ , p
w), pw), and (2.1)
M∗y (p
∗(τ ∗, pw), pw) = pwE∗x(p
∗(τ∗, pw), pw). (2.2)
The equilibrium world price, epw(τ , τ ∗), may now be determined by the requirement
of market-clearing for good y:
Ey(p(τ , epw), epw) =M∗y (p∗(τ∗, epw), epw), (2.3)
with market clearing for good x then implied by (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). Thus,
given any pair of tariﬀs, the equilibrium world price is determined by (2.3), and
the equilibrium world price and the given tariﬀs then determine in turn the local
prices and thereby the production, consumption, import, export and tariﬀ revenue
levels. Finally, we assume that the Metzler and Lerner paradoxes are ruled out,
so that dp/dτ > 0 > dp∗/dτ∗ and ∂ epw/∂τ < 0 < ∂ epw/∂τ∗.
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2.1.2. The Traditional Economic Approach
The antecedents of the traditional economic approach to trade agreements can be
traced back to the writings of Torrens (1844) and Mill (1844), who discuss the role
of terms-of-trade eﬀects in determining optimal tariﬀ policy. In a seminal contri-
bution, Johnson (1953-54) formalizes the terms-of-trade-driven ineﬃciencies that
a trade agreement can correct by combining the hypothesis that governments
use tariﬀs to manipulate the terms of trade with the separate hypothesis that
governments seek to maximize national welfare. As exemplified by the work of
Dixit (1987), recent research has exposited this argument in formal game-theoretic
terms. The modeling strategy taken there is to represent the governments’ “pay-
oﬀs” (i.e., national welfares) in terms of their “strategies” (i.e., tariﬀs), in order
to characterize the Nash equilibrium welfares and tariﬀs.
While this modeling strategy reflects the usual game-theoretic specification,
we choose here to represent governments’ objectives directly in terms of the lo-
cal and world prices that their tariﬀ selections imply. This representation high-
lights the ineﬃciency that arises when governments are motivated by terms-of-
trade considerations. Using the notation developed above, we therefore repre-
sent domestic national welfare as V (p(τ , epw), epw) ≡ v(p(τ , epw), I(p(τ , epw), epw)),
where v denotes the indirect utility function of the representative agent in the
domestic country and I is domestic national income measured in units of good
y at local prices.4 The objective of the foreign government, V ∗(p∗(τ∗, epw), epw) ≡
v∗(p∗(τ∗, epw), I∗(p∗(τ∗, epw), epw)), is similarly defined.
We now outline the rationale for trade agreements that the traditional eco-
nomic approach provides. Figure 1 illustrates the main findings of this literature.
The point labeled N depicts the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the tar-
iﬀ retaliation and counter-retaliation game as originally envisioned by Johnson
(1953-54). At the equilibrium point N , the home (foreign) iso-welfare is verti-
cal (horizontal), reflecting the fact that from this point neither government can
improve its payoﬀ with a unilateral change in its tariﬀ policy. The outcome at
N clearly represents an ineﬃcient combination of tariﬀ choices, as at this point
the home and foreign iso-welfare contours are not tangent. Hence, as Johnson
(1953-54) stresses, while neither country can improve its lot with unilateral trade-
policy initiatives, each country could in principle be made better oﬀ under a trade
4As epw is a function of tariﬀs, it is apparent that the government’s objective could also be
represented as a function of tariﬀs, as in Dixit’s (1987) model. Specifically, we could represent
the government’s objective as F (τ , τ∗) ≡ V (p(τ , epw), epw).
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agreement that called for mutual tariﬀ adjustments.
In subsequent work, Mayer (1981) shows that the eﬃcient tariﬀ pairs in this
setting satisfy the relationship τ = 1/τ ∗, as these tariﬀ pairs equalize local prices
across countries and thereby achieve world-wide economic eﬃciency. Of course,
reciprocal free trade (i.e., τ = τ∗ = 1) is among the eﬃcient tariﬀ pairs, but there
is in fact an entire set of eﬃcient tariﬀ pairs that involve one country taxing and
the other subsidizing its imports. This set is depicted in Figure 1 by the locus
passing through the reciprocal-free-trade point and labeled E → E, with each
point on this locus representing an eﬃcient tariﬀ pair that is distinguished by
the particular international distribution of income that the associated world price
implies. The bold portion of the locus E → E corresponds to the contract curve
(i.e., the tariﬀs that are eﬃcient and yield greater-than-Nash welfare for each
country). As pointed out by Johnson (1953-54) and later emphasized by Mayer
(1981) and also Kennan and Reizman (1988), the contract curve need not include
the point of reciprocal free trade if countries are suﬃciently asymmetric. In the
case depicted in Figure 1, any asymmetries between countries are suﬃciently small
that the contract curve includes the point of reciprocal free trade.
While the government preferences associated with the traditional economic
approach are overly simplistic, an attractive feature of this approach is that
the potential role of trade agreements is quite clear: trade agreements provide
governments with an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’
Dilemma. To confirm this, we consider the hypothetical trade policy that each
government would pursue if it ignored its ability to aﬀect the terms of trade. For
the home government, this would amount to setting its tariﬀ to satisfy the con-
dition Vp = 0. Using standard properties of the indirect utility function, we then
have that Vp = t · vI ·∂Mx(p(τ , epw), epw)/∂p, and so Vp = 0 implies that a domestic
policy of free trade would be chosen. In similar fashion, V ∗p∗ = 0 implies that
the foreign country would adopt a policy of free trade as well. Hence, according
to the traditional economic approach, it is the pursuit of terms-of-trade gains -
and this pursuit alone - that leads governments away from the eﬃcient outcome
of reciprocal free trade to the ineﬃcient Nash outcome. The purpose of a trade
agreement is then to guide governments back to a point on the contract curve.
The traditional economic approach oﬀers a clear explanation for the creation
of GATT, but many economists regard the practical relevance of this argument
with some skepticism. As we discuss briefly in Section 2.1.3 and in greater detail
in Section 7, this skepticism derives from several objections, and upon closer
scrutiny the validity of some of these objections may be questioned. At this point,
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though, we simply note that the traditional approach ignores the manifest political
constraints under which real governments operate. We therefore consider next the
leading alternative, which adopts a political-economy perspective and emphasizes
the political motivations that influence government preferences.
2.1.3. The Political-Economy Approach
The distinguishing feature of the political-economy approach is that governments
may care about the political (i.e., distributional) as well as economic-eﬃciency
consequences of the local-price movements that their tariﬀ selections imply. When
government preferences are generalized in this way, it may be expected that gov-
ernments’ economic incentive to manipulate the terms of trade again creates an
ineﬃciency that a trade agreement can remedy. But does a separate political
rationale for trade agreements arise as well? To address this question, we follow
Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) and present here a general representation of govern-
ment preferences that includes both the traditional case that governments maxi-
mize national welfare as well as the general possibility that governments are also
motivated by distributional concerns. We then consider whether governments’
tariﬀ selections would be eﬃcient (relative to their own preferences) if they were
to ignore their ability to aﬀect the terms of trade.5
Government Preferences We begin with a description of government prefer-
ences. The objectives of home and foreign governments are represented by the
general functions W (p(τ , epw), epw) and W ∗(p∗(τ ∗, epw), epw), respectively. The only
structure placed on W and W ∗ is that, holding its local price fixed, each govern-
ment is assumed to achieve higher welfare when its terms of trade improve:
∂W (p, epw)/∂ epw < 0 and ∂W ∗(p∗, epw)/∂ epw > 0. (2.4)
The content of this assumption can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 2. There
an initial tariﬀ pair is represented by the point A ≡ (τ , τ ∗), and this tariﬀ pair is
associated with a domestic iso-local-price locus, p(A) → p(A), and an iso-world-
price locus, pw(A) → pw(A).6 A second iso-world-price locus is also depicted,
5Notice that the simple argument used in the previous subsection to confirm the eﬃciency
of such tariﬀ selections utilized properties of the indirect utility function and thus cannot be
applied in the context of the general representation of government preferences considered here.
6Under the assumptions that the Metzler and Lerner Paradoxes are absent, the iso-world-
price locus has positive slope while the iso-local-price locus slopes down, as Figure 2 depicts.
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and along this locus the world price is lower than at point A, indicating an im-
proved terms-of-trade for the domestic country. A reduction in the world price
that maintains the domestic local price is thus achieved with the movement from
A to B, corresponding to a higher (lower) domestic (foreign) import tariﬀ. Con-
dition (2.4) requires only that the international income transfer implied by the
movement from A to B is valued by the domestic government. Throughout, we
also assume that the second-order conditions associated with the maximization
problems developed below are globally satisfied.
In both the traditional economic approach and the leading political-economy
approaches to trade policy, governments set trade policy as if they were maximiz-
ing a function of this form. With respect to the former approach, we note that
the national welfare of a country improves when it experiences a terms-of-trade
improvement. Within the political-economy literature, one possibility is that the
government arises from a representative democracy. In this case, as Mayer (1984)
shows, the government sets its trade policy to promote the interests of the median
voter, whose utility can be represented as a function of this form. Alternatively,
as Baldwin (1987) observes, the major approaches to the political economy of
trade policy, as represented in the work by Olson (1965), Caves (1976), Brock and
Magee (1978), Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and
Hillman (1982), can all be represented in this way. Finally, the lobbying models
of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) also fit within this framework.
A further possibility, suggested by Baldwin (1985), is that a government is
motivated by autonomous ideological concerns that shape its general goals but
faces a political-support constraint when setting trade policy to pursue these
goals. A possibility of particular interest is that the home government is a “free-
trader,” whose ability to implement free-trade policies is hindered by the need to
mobilize export support to oﬀset political opposition to its liberalization eﬀorts
from import-competing sectors. To see that this possibility is included, let G
represent the objectives of the domestic government and let the domestic gov-
ernment’s political-support constraint be captured by the inequality restriction
S(p(τ , epw), epw) ≥ S. We may now form the associated Lagrangian, W , so that
the domestic government ultimately seeks to maximize a function of the form:
W (p(τ , epw), epw) = G(p(τ , epw), epw) + ρ[S(p(τ , epw), epw)− S],
where ρ, the Lagrangian multiplier, is also a function of p and epw. Thus, the
problem facing a liberalizing government that must mobilize export support can
be represented within the modeling framework described here.
13
Unilateral Trade Policies We consider next the unilateral trade policies that
would arise in the absence of a trade agreement. Our general set-up can be used
to illuminate the motivations that influence a government’s tariﬀ selection in the
various political-economy models of trade policy. As we are no longer limited
to the familiar framework associated with the traditional economic approach to
trade agreements, we now explain these motivations in greater detail.
To begin, we suppose that each government sets its trade policy to maximize
its objective function taking as given the tariﬀ choice of its trading partner. These
optimization problems generate home and foreign reaction functions, which are
defined implicitly by
Home : Wp[dp/dτ ] +Wpw [∂ epw/∂τ ] = 0 (2.5)
Foreign : W ∗p∗[dp
∗/dτ ∗] +W ∗pw [∂ epw/∂τ ∗] = 0, (2.6)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Letting λ ≡ [∂ epw/∂τ ]/[dp/dτ ] < 0
and λ∗ ≡ [∂ epw/∂τ ∗]/[dp∗/dτ∗] < 0, we may rewrite (2.5) and (2.6) as:
Home : Wp + λWpw = 0, (2.7)
Foreign : W ∗p∗ + λ
∗W ∗pw = 0. (2.8)
As (2.7) and (2.8) illustrate, each government’s best-response tariﬀ is determined
by the combined impact on welfare of the induced local and world price changes.
The determinants of the best-response tariﬀs of politically-motivated govern-
ments can be further illustrated by returning to Figure 2. Starting from the initial
tariﬀ pair represented by the point A ≡ (τ , τ ∗), suppose now that the domestic
government decides unilaterally to increase its tariﬀ. Given the fixed foreign tar-
iﬀ τ∗, an increase in the domestic tariﬀ from τ to τ 1 induces a new tariﬀ pair,
represented by point C ≡ (τ 1, τ∗). This tariﬀ pair lies on a new iso-local-price
locus, given as p(C)→ p(C), and also a new iso-world-price locus, represented as
pw(C)→ pw(C). Thus, by increasing its tariﬀ, the domestic government induces
a local price that is higher and a world price that is lower as compared to the
prices associated with the original point A.
In analogy with (2.7), Figure 2 can be used to disentangle the overall movement
from A to C induced by a unilateral tariﬀ increase by the domestic government
into separate movements in the local and world prices, respectively. Consider first
the movement from A to B. This movement isolates the change in the world
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price, and the corresponding welfare eﬀect for the domestic government is cap-
tured in (2.7) with the term λWpw , which is strictly positive by (2.4). Consider
next the movement from B to C. This movement isolates the induced increase
in the local price, holding fixed the world price, and the corresponding change
in the domestic government’s welfare is represented in (2.7) with the term Wp.
The welfare implications of the local-price movement from B to C reflect the bal-
ance between the costs of the associated domestic distortions in production and
consumption against any domestic political benefits. The welfare implications of
the world-price movement from A to B, by contrast, reflect the benefits to the
domestic government of shifting the costs of its policy onto the foreign govern-
ment. It follows that, if the domestic government seeks to implement a local price
corresponding to the iso-local-price locus p(C)→ p(C), then a unilateral increase
in the domestic import tariﬀ shifts some of the costs of this outcome onto the
foreign government. A similar interpretation applies for (2.8).
Consider now the Nash equilibrium that arises when both governments set
tariﬀs unilaterally. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of tariﬀs, (τN , τ∗N), which simul-
taneously satisfy (2.7) and (2.8). We assume that the Nash equilibrium, which we
take to be unique, represents the trade-policy decisions that governments would
make if there were no trade agreement. The next step is to determine if these
decisions are eﬃcient for the governments.
The Value of a Trade Agreement We assume that governments seek a trade
agreement in order to achieve mutually beneficial changes in trade policy. Put dif-
ferently, through a trade agreement, governments seek tariﬀ changes that result in
Pareto improvements beyond the Nash government-welfare levels achieved under
unilateral tariﬀ setting. A trade agreement entails reciprocal trade liberalization
if the tariﬀs of both countries are lower than in the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an
eﬃcient trade agreement must be on the eﬃciency frontier, which is defined by
[dτ/dτ∗]dW=0 = [dτ/dτ∗]dW∗=0. (2.9)
This frontier can be represented more concretely as the set of tariﬀs that satisfy
(1− AWp)(1− A∗W ∗p∗) = 1, (2.10)
where A ≡ (1 − τλ)/(Wp + λWpw) and A∗ ≡ (1 − λ∗/τ∗)/(W ∗p∗ + λ∗W ∗pw), with
A 6= 0 and A∗ 6= 0 under the further assumption that the partial derivatives of
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the welfare functions are always finite.7
The eﬃciency of the unilateral tariﬀ decisions of politically-motivated govern-
ments may now be assessed. A first observation is that the Nash equilibrium
is indeed ineﬃcient, as can be confirmed by observing from (2.7) and (2.8) that
the Nash tariﬀs fail to satisfy the eﬃciency condition (2.10). Intuitively, when
governments set their trade policies unilaterally, they are motivated to shift costs
onto one another through the change in the world price that their tariﬀs imply.
A second observation is that trade agreements among politically motivated
governments must entail reciprocal trade liberalization. In other words, both
governments can experience welfare gains relative to the Nash equilibrium only if
each agrees to set its tariﬀ below the Nash level.8 The intuition for this observation
is also clear. When governments set their trade policies in a unilateral fashion,
they are led to set tariﬀs that are higher than is eﬃcient, since they each recognize
that some of the costs of a higher tariﬀ can be passed on to the trading partner,
through the consequent changes in the world price. Thus, if both governments
are to gain through a trade agreement, it is not surprising that each must lower
its tariﬀ to a level that is below that which it chooses in the Nash equilibrium.
Evidently, the appeal of reciprocal trade liberalization is in no way limited to the
hypothesis that governments maximize national welfare.
A remaining question concerns the exact nature of the ineﬃciency that explains
the appeal of a trade agreement under the political-economy approach. Clearly,
the terms-of-trade externality is one ineﬃciency that can be remedied with an
appropriate trade agreement. But are there additional “political externalities”
that might be remedied as well? To establish conclusively that the terms-of-trade
externality is the only ineﬃciency that a trade agreement can remedy in this
environment, we proceed as in the previous section and consider a hypothetical
world in which governments are not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications
7See Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) for a derivation of the eﬃciency locus in this form. As
noted above, in the case that governments maximize national welfare, Mayer (1981) shows that
the eﬃciency locus reduces to the form τ = 1/τ∗, so that tariﬀs maintain equality in relative
local prices between the domestic and foreign countries. In the more general formulation of
government preferences considered here, it is again true that the eﬃciency locus determines a
relationship between domestic and foreign tariﬀs, but it need not be the case that this relation-
ship equates relative local prices across trading partners.
8See Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) for a proof of this statement. A reduction in tariﬀs from
the Nash level, however, is not suﬃcient to guarantee mutual welfare gains. For example, as
we noted in the previous section, Johnson (1953-54), Kennan and Reizman (1988) and Mayer
(1981) show that a large country may be better oﬀ at the Nash equilibrium than with free trade,
if countries are suﬃciently asymmetric.
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of their trade policy choices.9 If unilateral tariﬀ choices would be eﬃcient in
such a world, then we may conclude that the terms-of-trade externality is the
only rationale for a trade agreement under the political-economy approach. To
this end, we define politically optimal tariﬀs as any tariﬀ pair (τPO, τ ∗PO) that
satisfies the following two conditions:10
Home : Wp = 0 (2.11)
Foreign :W ∗p∗ = 0. (2.12)
When governments set politically optimal tariﬀs, it is as if they throw any welfare
gains that are attributable to changes in the world price “back into the ocean.” In
the special case where governments seek to maximize national welfare, politically
optimal tariﬀs correspond to reciprocal free trade, as we establish in Section 2.1.2.
More generally, government objectives may also reflect political considerations,
and in this case there is no expectation that politically optimal tariﬀs correspond
to reciprocal free trade.
A third observation can now be made: politically optimal tariﬀs are eﬃcient.
Formally, this is direct from the definition of politically optimal tariﬀs given in
(2.11) and (2.12) and the characterization of the eﬃciency locus presented in
(2.10). To gain some intuition for this finding, let us suppose that the terms-
of-trade motivation has been removed from the trade-policy decisions of each
government. In this case, each government sets its trade policy so as to achieve
its preferred local price. With tariﬀs thus set at their politically optimal levels,
consider now a small increase in the tariﬀ of the domestic country. This change
has three eﬀects. First, it induces a small increase in the local price in the do-
mestic country. This eﬀect, however, has no first-order impact on the domestic
government’s welfare, since the domestic government initially has its preferred
local price. Second, the domestic tariﬀ increase induces a small reduction in the
local price of the foreign country. But this eﬀect has no first-order impact on
9We do not assume that governments fail to understand the terms-of-trade eﬀects of their
tariﬀ choices. Rather, we wish to consider the hypothetical situation in which governments are
not motivated by these eﬀects. In terms of (2.7), governments understand that λ < 0, but we
now suppose their welfare functions were such that Wpw ≡ 0. We wish to identify the tariﬀs
that would be selected by governments with these hypothetical preferences and then evaluate
the eﬃciency properties of these tariﬀs with respect to actual government preferences.
10We assume further that a unique set of politically optimal tariﬀs exists and that the asso-
ciated second-order conditions are globally satisfied.
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the foreign government’s welfare, since the foreign government also initially has
its preferred local price. Finally, the small increase in the domestic government’s
tariﬀ generates a corresponding reduction in the world price. The world-price
reduction cannot generate an eﬃciency gain, however, as it represents a pure in-
ternational transfer in tariﬀ revenue. It thus follows that, once the terms-of-trade
motivation is eliminated from the trade-policy choices of governments, there is no
further scope for Pareto improvements.
These three observations regarding the political-economy approach can be
summarized with Figure 3.11 In line with the first observation reported above,
notice that the Nash tariﬀs (point N) lie oﬀ of the eﬃciency locus as charac-
terized by (2.10) and depicted by the curve E → E. The figure also represents
the Nash iso-welfare curves for the domestic and foreign governments, and these
curves illustrate the second observation reported above: a trade agreement can
increase the welfare of both governments beyond that received in the Nash equi-
librium only if the agreement results in a reduction in both tariﬀs. Finally, as
the third observation made above requires, the politically optimal tariﬀs (point
PO) lie on the eﬃciency locus. Notice that iso-welfare curves are tangent at every
point along this locus, including the politically optimal point. The novel feature
of the politically optimal tariﬀs is that the iso-welfare curves at these tariﬀs are
also tangent to the iso-world-price locus (the locus pwPO). The bold portion of the
eﬃciency locus corresponds to the contract curve.
Figure 3 clarifies the basic task facing politically motivated governments who
seek to design a trade agreement. In the absence of any attempt at cooperation,
governments would set trade policies unilaterally, leading to the Nash outcome
N. A trade agreement is then appealing to governments as a means to cooperate
and move the tariﬀs from the ineﬃcient Nash point to some alternative tariﬀ pair
that rests on the contract curve. Among the tariﬀs that lie on the contract curve,
the politically optimal tariﬀs are quite focal, as these tariﬀs remedy the terms-of-
trade ineﬃciency in a direct fashion. As Figure 3 illustrates, when governments
have both political and economic objectives, the eﬃciency locus need not pass
through the point of free trade. While governments’ political concerns aﬀect their
preferences over tariﬀs (e.g., the location of the eﬃciency locus), however, it is
the terms-of-trade externality that creates a problem when governments set tariﬀs
11In drawing this picture, we assume that a unique Nash equilibrium exists, a unique political
optimum exists, and that the political optimum lies on the contract curve (i.e., it is on the eﬃ-
ciency locus and yields greater-than-Nash welfare for each government). The latter assumption
is satisfied provided that countries are suﬃciently symmetric.
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unilaterally which an appropriately designed trade agreement can solve.
The Interpretation of the Terms-of-Trade Externality At the broadest
level, the discussion above confirms a simple notion: governments can gain from
trade-policy cooperation, if otherwise each would attempt to shift costs onto the
other, resulting in ineﬃcient unilateral policies. The terms-of-trade externality is
then simply the means through which such cost shifting would occur.
Yet, as mentioned in Section 2.1.2, many economists are skeptical of the prac-
tical relevance of the terms-of-trade argument for trade agreements. In part, this
skepticism derives from the abstract manner in which the traditional theory is
usually interpreted. This interpretation stresses that trade is a process in which
the home country exchanges its exports for those from a foreign country, and the
government of a large home country can thus ensure that a given volume of its
exports commands a greater volume of foreign exports (i.e., improve its terms of
trade) if it imposes an import tariﬀ (so that the foreign export is abundant on
world markets) or an export tax (so that the home export is scarce on world mar-
kets). This interpretation is, of course, theoretically valid; however, it emphasizes
a logic that would not likely enter the practical minds of policy makers.
At the same time, the terms-of-trade theory may be interpreted in other man-
ners, which suggest greater practical relevance. First, from a partial-equilibrium
perspective, cost shifting occurs via the terms-of-trade externality if foreign ex-
porters bear some of the incidence of the import tariﬀ. Then, unilateral tariﬀs are
ineﬃcient for an intuitive and plausible reason: the domestic government does not
internalize the harm to foreign exporters that its import tariﬀ implies.12 In most
economic settings, the natural presumption is that producers bear some of the
incidence of a tax, and we argue in the concluding section that strong empirical
support for this presumption exists in the trade context as well. Second, when
the home government raises its import tariﬀ and thereby shifts in its import de-
mand curve, the consequent “price eﬀect” (i.e., the home country’s terms-of-trade
improvement) has a corresponding “volume eﬀect” (i.e., the foreign country’s re-
duction in access to the home market). From this perspective, it is natural that
real-world trade-policy negotiators emphasize the market-access implications of
trade policy.13 Indeed, we may interpret “cost shifting,” “terms-of-trade gain,”
12This interpretation is developed further in Bagwell and Staiger (1997a), where we derive
the three observations mentioned above in a partial-equilibrium model.
13This emphasis is well exemplified by the following excerpt from a GATT panel report (con-
cerning a dispute between the U.S. and the E.E.C. concerning E.E.C. domestic subsidies for
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and “market-access restriction” as three phrases that describe the single economic
experience that occurs when the domestic government raises its import tariﬀ and
restricts foreign access to its market.
This linkage between the terms of trade and market access can be formalized
with a few definitions. For a given world price pw and domestic tariﬀ τ , the mar-
ket access that the domestic country aﬀords to the foreign country is defined by
the domestic import demand function, Mx(p(τ , pw), pw). Similarly, given a world
price pw and a foreign tariﬀ τ∗, the market access that the foreign country aﬀords
to the domestic country is defined by M∗y (p
∗(τ ∗, pw), pw). We may now say that
a government secures additional market access from its trading partner through
negotiations if there exists a world price such that the trading partner’s negotiated
policy changes provide additional access to the trading partner’s market (i.e., if
the trading partner’s import demand curves shifts out for at least some world
price). Given this definition, if the domestic government were to fail to secure ad-
ditional market access from its foreign trading partner through negotiations, then
the foreign import demand curve would shift in (weakly) at all world price levels.
Assuming that the Marshall-Lerner stability conditions are met, such an inward
shift in the foreign import demand curve would contribute toward a (weakly)
higher equilibrium world price, epw. Therefore, if the domestic government were to
fail to secure additional market access from its foreign trading partner through ne-
gotiations, then the foreign country’s agreed-upon tariﬀ changes would contribute
toward a terms-of-trade loss (weakly) for the domestic country.
With this linkage established, the findings developed above can be interpreted
in terms of market access. For instance, it may be confirmed (see Bagwell and
Staiger, forthcoming) that the essential ineﬃciency arising in the Nash equilibrium
can be described as one of insuﬃcient market access. Hence, the terms-of-trade
externality provides a rationale for why negotiators would emphasize the market-
access implications of trade policy. In fact, the second observation raised above
can be re-stated as follows: Beginning at the Nash equilibrium, each government
must secure additional market access from its trading partner in order to reach
a mutually beneficial agreement. It may thus be seen that, upon closer scrutiny,
the terms-of-trade externality provides a rather direct theory of the market-access
concerns that dominate real-world trade policy negotiations.
oilseed producers): “...the main value of a tariﬀ concession is that it provides assurance of
better market access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariﬀ
concessions primarily to obtain that advantage.” (as quoted in Petersmann, 1997, p. 168)
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2.1.4. The Commitment Approach
A third approach to the study of trade agreements is the commitment approach,
which emphasizes the diﬃculty governments may face in making policy commit-
ments to the private sector and suggests that trade agreements may provide one
way to enhance policy credibility.14 In contrast to the traditional economic and
political-economy approaches reviewed above, the commitment approach redirects
the focus of analysis from the game between governments to the game between
each government and its private sector, in which the government chooses its trade
policy and agents in the private sector make some production or investment deci-
sions. A credibility problem may arise when a government has too much flexibility
in setting trade policy.
This problem can be captured in a game between the government and its pro-
ducers, in which the government sets its trade policy after production decisions
are made. In this case, the government may have incentive to surprise produc-
ers with a level of protection that it would not choose ex ante, when producers’
decisions are still unsettled. The government’s preferred ex ante and ex post
tariﬀ selections diﬀer, since, once producer decisions are determined, the govern-
ment recognizes that its tariﬀ choice only aﬀects consumer decisions. Of course,
if producers understand the government’s incentives, then they will alter their
production decisions in anticipation of the government’s actions, and production
decisions are therefore distorted. This production distortion is the real cost of
trade-policy flexibility, and the identification of this cost suggests that a trade
agreement could increase (ex ante) government welfare if it enables the govern-
ment to commit to its (ex ante) preferred tariﬀ.
The commitment role for a trade agreement is distinct from terms-of-trade
considerations. Maggi and Rodriguez (1998) oﬀer an interesting recent formaliza-
tion of the commitment approach. They focus on a small-country model, so that
the terms-of-trade argument for a trade agreement is eliminated, and they allow
that one of the two sectors can form a lobby. The government values national
welfare and contributions from the lobby, as in the Grossman-Helpman (1994)
model. In this case, the political process can distort the equilibrium allocation of
resources: the politically-organized sector may be larger than it would be under
14Papers that consider credibility problems associated with the use of trade-policy instruments
include Carmichael (1987), Staiger and Tabellini (1987, 1989, 1999), Gruenspecht (1988), Lapan
(1988), Maskin and Newberry (1990), Matsuyama (1990), Tornell (1991), Devereaux (1993),
Brainard (1994), Mayer (1994), Staiger (1995a), McLaren (1997, 1999), Grossman and Maggi
(1998), Maggi and Rodriguez (1998), Krishna and Mitra (1999) and Mitra (1999).
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free trade, as firms invest in this sector in order to enjoy the protection that their
contributions induce. This distortion in turn can give the government an incentive
to commit to free trade, and it is assumed that the government can accomplish
this by joining a pre-constituted free-trade agreement. To the government, the
benefit of this commitment is that the investment distortions are forestalled, while
the cost of this commitment is that political rents (lobby contributions) are lost.
The particular features of the political process are thus relevant for determining
whether the government chooses the free-trade commitment: a commitment to
free trade is most valuable when the government’s bargaining position vis-a-vis
the lobby is weak (as then the government cannot extract large rents through
the political process) and when the government’s responsiveness to contributions
relative to national welfare is neither too low (as then the investment distortions
are in any event modest) nor too high (as then the government is reluctant to
forgo political contributions).
More broadly, there are a variety of commitment problems which a government
might face, whether or not the government is politically motivated. For example,
in line with Matsuyama’s (1990) model, a government might seek to eliminate
protection of an industry, once the industry invests suﬃciently in cost reduction. It
may be, however, that the government would maintain protection if the investment
does not occur. A commitment problem then arises, as the private sector may
foresee the government’s dilemma and decide not to undertake the investment,
eﬀectively ensuring that the government’s ex-post incentive is to continue the
protectionist policy. If the government is unable to commit to withdraw protection
on its own, it may then look to a trade agreement as a means to make credible
the liberalization initiative. A trade agreement can serve this purpose, if trading
partners credibly threaten to retaliate (say, by imposing tariﬀs on the domestic
export product) should the liberalization process not occur. This threat can
alter the government’s ex-post incentives, such that it prefers to liberalize even if
investment is not undertaken, which in turn ensures that the private sector does,
in fact, undertake the desired investment.
2.1.5. Comparison of Approaches
Having reviewed the three major approaches to the study of trade agreements,
we now summarize our findings. A comparison of Figure 3 with Figure 1 reveals
the essential diﬀerence between the traditional economic approach to the study of
trade agreements and the political-economy approach. By allowing that govern-
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ments have political motivations, the political-economy approach “frees up” the
eﬃciency locus to correspond to a richer set of potential outcomes than simply
free trade. This represents an important advance over the traditional economic
approach, in that it allows an interpretation of why free trade is so rarely the
goal of trade agreements. But aside from this rescaling, the political-economy
approach adds nothing to an understanding of the essential purpose of trade
agreements based on traditional economic arguments. Under both the traditional
economic and the political-economy approaches, trade agreements provide govern-
ments with an avenue of escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma.
By contrast, the commitment approach identifies a distinct role that trade agree-
ments may play, by suggesting that such agreements could help governments make
commitments to their private sectors. With regard to the purpose of trade agree-
ments, the literature therefore divides naturally according to which of two distinct
roles the trade agreement is seen to fulfill. Strikingly, while many observers feel
that “politics” is at the heart of understanding trade agreements, fundamental to
neither role is the presence or absence of political considerations.15
This may be interpreted in either of two ways. On the one hand, if polit-
ical considerations do explain the creation of GATT, then the existing models
have failed to capture the relevant political ingredients. If this interpretation is
adopted, then the immediate implication is that a political explanation for the
existence of GATT requires a fresh modeling approach. On the other hand, one
might conclude that either the traditional terms-of-trade externality or a com-
mitment problem (or some combination of both) is indeed the central problem
that GATT is designed to solve. From this perspective, the political-economy
approach described above captures the essential terms-of-trade externality in an
augmented framework that allows for broader political motivations. This conclu-
sion carries with it a fundamentally diﬀerent modeling implication, as it suggests
that the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade and commitment theories provide
the necessary building blocks for a modeling framework with which to interpret
and evaluate GATT and its features.
In the remainder of this paper, we adopt the latter interpretation. In fact,
while the commitment approach may play an important eventual role in this
regard, there are as yet only a few papers that use this approach to interpret and
15While the political-economy approach does not oﬀer a separate reason for the creation of a
trade agreement (i.e., for a divergence between Nash tariﬀs and the eﬃciency frontier), models
of this form can deliver new predictions concerning the extent to which tariﬀs will be reduced
in a trade agreement (i.e., concerning the extent of the divergence).
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evaluate certain features of GATT. For this reason, in the remainder of the paper,
most of our discussion centers on research that adopts the traditional economic
and political-economy approaches.
2.2. Rules versus Power
Let us suppose then that the purpose of a trade agreement is to provide an es-
cape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma. A fundamental question
remains: How might governments structure their negotiations? In this section
we consider possible negotiating approaches by which governments might move
from an ineﬃcient Nash equilibrium, such as that depicted by the point N in
Figure 3, to a point on the contract curve. We highlight above a particular point
on the contract curve, the political optimum, because politically optimal tariﬀs
remedy the Nash ineﬃciency in a very direct way. But in general there is no
a-priori reason to expect that governments would choose the political optimum
over any other point on the contract curve, and indeed the outcome ultimately
depends on the structure of negotiations. In broad terms, we can distinguish be-
tween two approaches to the negotiation of trade agreements, which we refer to as
“power-based” and “rules-based” negotiations (see Jackson, 1997, pp. 109-112).
To illustrate the issues involved, we refer to Figure 4, where the contract curve
from Figure 3 is depicted in welfare space, with W measured on the vertical axis
and W ∗ on the horizontal axis. The origin measures the “disagreement” (i.e.,
status quo) welfare for each government, which we take to be the Nash welfare
levels denoted by WN and W ∗N , and the political optimum (labeled PO) lies on
the frontier as depicted, with the corresponding welfare levels denoted by WPO
and W ∗PO. The slope of the contract curve in welfare space is easily calculated,
and at the political optimum it is given byWPOpw /W
∗PO
pw , as displayed in the figure.
When seeking a reciprocal trade agreement, governments require an approach
to negotiations which serves to move tariﬀs from the ineﬃcient disagreement point
to the contract curve. One possibility would be a “power-based” approach, in
which governments bargain over tariﬀs in a direct fashion that is not constrained
by agreed-upon principles of negotiation. Consider, for example, the tariﬀs that
would be implemented if negotiations were characterized by the Nash Bargaining
Solution. This solution generates a point on the contract curve which maximizes
B ≡ (W−WN)(W ∗−W ∗N). In Figure 4, this point is labeled as NBS, and it cor-
responds to the point on the contract curve with slope −(W −WN )/(W ∗−W ∗N ).
The welfare levels for each government associated with the Nash Bargaining So-
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lution can then be achieved with the corresponding tariﬀs from Figure 3. Notice
that the Nash Bargaining Solution induces the political optimum only in the
“symmetric” case where (W PO −WN)/(−W POpw ) = (W ∗PO −W ∗N)/W ∗POpw . If the
domestic country were the relatively more “powerful” of the two, in the sense that
(W PO −WN)/(−WPOpw ) < (W ∗PO −W ∗N)/W ∗POpw , then (as depicted in Figure 4)
the Nash Bargaining Solution would favor the domestic country relative to what
it would receive at the political optimum.16 As such, a power-based approach to
the negotiation of trade agreements would lead to negotiated outcomes on the
contract curve, and any divergence in these outcomes from the political optimum
could be said to reflect “power asymmetries” across negotiating partners.
While a power-based approach can serve to move tariﬀs from the ineﬃcient
disagreement point to the contract curve, this is not the approach to trade ne-
gotiations taken by members of GATT. The approach to negotiations embodied
in GATT can be more aptly termed a “rules-based” approach. Under such an
approach, governments identify and agree upon certain principles by which sub-
sequent negotiations must abide.
Of course, to understand the outcomes of trade negotiations within GATT,
it is necessary to appreciate the specific rules by which GATT member countries
must abide. Indeed, if GATT as an institution has an impact on the trade poli-
cies which governments adopt, it may largely be through the particular set of
rules by which the conduct of member countries is judged. A central question is
then whether GATT rules can serve to reduce, or even eliminate, existing power
asymmetries across negotiating partners. From the perspective of the (politically
augmented) terms-of-trade theory, this question may be put more starkly: Do
GATT rules serve to induce large countries to behave as if they were small coun-
tries, and thereby guide the outcome of trade negotiations toward the political
optimum? In Section 3 below, we describe the core features of GATT’s rules, and
this description provides the basis for our subsequent evaluation and interpreta-
tion of GATT as an institution. But before turning to a description of the rules
of GATT, we maintain the broader theoretical theme of the present section and
consider how the outcome of negotiations, once agreed to, is enforced.
16In the case of national-income maximizing governments, this measure of relative “power”
reduces to a cross-country comparison of each country’s national-welfare gain in moving from a
trade war to reciprocal free trade (see, for example, Johnson, 1953/54, Kennan and Riezman,
1988, and Mayer, 1981). Our discussion above assumes for simplicity that neither country is in
a position to “win” the tariﬀ war, so that WPO ≥WN and W ∗PO ≥ W ∗N , but the remaining
cases can be handled as well.
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2.3. Enforcement
If a trade agreement is to provide an escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Prison-
ers’ Dilemma, how is the agreement to be enforced? After all, the cost-shifting
temptations which governments face when making trade-policy decisions do not
simply go away once an agreement is signed. On the contrary, each government
has a short-term incentive to deviate to a higher-than-is-eﬃcient tariﬀ, in order to
reap the consequent terms-of-trade gains. For example, a government facing re-
newed political pressure to protect an import-competing sector would be tempted
to provide a greater level of import relief than would be eﬃcient, if it thought
that it could get away with shifting part of the cost of this relief onto its trading
partners. As there is no “world jail” into which government leaders can be thrown
if they are shown to have violated a trade agreement, governments are likely to be
dissuaded from such opportunistic behavior only if the pursuit of short-term gains
results in long-term losses, as when other governments retaliate in kind. Looked
at in this way, it is clear that the tariﬀs that governments can achieve as part of
a “self-enforcing” agreement reflect a balance between the short-term gains from
protection and the long-term losses from retaliation. The “most-cooperative” tar-
iﬀs that governments can enforce are more eﬃcient than Nash tariﬀs; they may
not, however, be fully eﬃcient. Moreover, a balance once achieved may subse-
quently be upset as underlying features of the trading environment change, and
attempts to “rebalance” the agreement may then arise.
As McMillan (1986, 1989), Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1990) em-
phasize, the enforcement issues that are associated with trade agreements may be
formally analyzed using the theory of repeated games. In particular, we may view
the static framework described in Section 2.1.3 above as the “stage game” of an
infinitely repeated game. As governments attempt to cooperate toward lower tar-
iﬀ combinations that approach the contract curve, they move below their reaction
functions (as defined by (2.7) and (2.8) above), and consequently each government
could benefit in the short-run from a unilateral tariﬀ increase. However, if each
government is concerned that such a deviation, once discovered, could undermine
the entire agreement and ultimately drive countries back to the ineﬃcient non-
cooperative Nash point, then this concern may serve as an eﬀective deterrent,
provided that the short-run temptations to cheat do not become too large. In
this way, some cooperation can be sustained.
In Sections 3 and 6, we consider the issue of enforcement in greater detail,
but we note here that the formal approach to enforcement taken by the repeated-
game literature is broadly consistent with the views expressed within GATT itself
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concerning the nature of the enforcement challenges it faces. For example, in
discussing the challenges governments faced as they sought to enhance GATT’s
dispute settlement procedures as part of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions, Croome (1995) quotes GATT’s then-Director General Arthur Dunkel:
“Dunkel summed up his view from the GATT Secretariat in a speech in London in
March 1981. He concluded that governments were being restrained from a substantial
slippage towards protectionism only by ‘a kind of balance of terror’: a fear that if they
resorted to trade restrictions these would evoke retaliation, as well as undermining the
trading system as a whole. Dunkel argued that this situation was untenable. The
system could not cope with the pressures generated by rapid economic change, the debt
diﬃculties of developing countries and other factors unless it could rely on a secure
and reliable basis, which would not be achieved without a ‘concerted eﬀort to establish
momentum in the right direction’. He added that he was ‘not unhopeful that such an
eﬀort will be made.’
“Dunkel’s hopes were founded primarily on his judgment that, acute though the
diﬀerences of view among GATT member countries might be, all were acutely worried
by the drift and deterioration in trade relations, and by the clear risk that the GATT
itself - the rule of law in international trade - would be so undermined and bypassed
that it would lose all credibility and eﬀectiveness. He also had a more immediate and
concrete reason for hope. A number of governments had told him that they would
allow a frank assessment of the trading system’s diﬃculties, and launch new eﬀorts to
overcome them.” Croome (1995, pp. 11-12).
There is a broad consistency between the formal theory of repeated games
and the expressed views of GATT oﬃcials concerning the means of restraining
governments from engaging in opportunistic behavior. This suggests that limits
on enforcement power may shape the kinds of agreements that can be negotiated
within GATT, much as the literature on self-enforcing trade agreements would
indicate. But it also raises additional issues regarding GATT’s role as an institu-
tion, such as the purpose that GATT’s dispute settlement procedures can serve in
maintaining the “balance of terror.” We return to these and related issues below.
3. The History and Design of GATT and the WTO
Having summarized the theoretical approaches to the study of trade agreements,
we now turn to the world’s major international trade institution and present an
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overview of the history and design of GATT and now the WTO. This overview
provides an institutional context that guides our survey in subsequent sections.
3.1. The Origin of GATT and the WTO
The origin of GATT can be traced to the trade-policy choices made by govern-
ments in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Trade barriers became increasingly restrictive in
the aftermath of World War I, and they reached extreme levels when the U.S.
enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariﬀ Act in 1930. Under this act, average U.S. tariﬀs
rose from 38 to 52%. Not surprisingly, many U.S. trading partners were quick
to respond, and in the following months tariﬀs were raised in Canada, Cuba,
France, Mexico, Italy, Spain, Australia and New Zealand. Other countries, in-
cluding Great Britain, joined the retaliatory outburst shortly after. Ultimately,
retaliatory tariﬀs were imposed in an almost universal fashion, and the post-
Smoot-Hawley tariﬀs rates for the major powers were on the order of 50%.17
According to Hudec (1990, p. 5), “the postwar design for international trade
policy was animated by a single-minded concern to avoid repeating the disastrous
errors of the 1920’s and 1930’s.” We may think of the “tariﬀ war” associated with
the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀs as corresponding to the Nash point N in Figure 3.18 The
task before governments was then to implement a more cooperative trade-policy
relationship, such as depicted in Figure 3 by the locus of eﬃcient tariﬀs.
An important step in this direction was spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, who emphasized bilateral trade-policy negotiations and whose eﬀorts
led to the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934. Hull proposed that the
U.S. oﬀer import tariﬀ reductions as “concessions” in exchange for reciprocal
reductions in the import tariﬀs of a foreign trading partner. Hull’s approach also
included a multilateral component: the U.S. tariﬀ reduction achieved through
a bilateral negotiation would then extend without discrimination to all trading
partners that had been granted MFN status by the U.S..
As Rhodes (1993, p. 56) argues, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was
important, as it marked the first time that the principles of reciprocity and non-
17For further discussion of the origin of GATT, see, for example, Culbert (1987), Dam (1970),
Enders (1997), Hoekman and Kostecki (1995), Hudec (1990), Jackson (1997), Low (1993),
Rhodes (1993) and Trebilcock and Howse (1999). Coneybeare (1987) provides a comprehen-
sive discussion of the Smoot-Hawley tariﬀ wars.
18In fact, Whalley (1985, p. 246) argues that the tariﬀ rates that prevailed among the major
powers after the Smoot-Hawley Tariﬀ Act were close to those that would be predicted for the
Nash equilibrium for a computable general-equilibrium model
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discrimination were united as fundamental components of U.S. trade policy. It is
interesting to remark further on the rationales that were oﬀered for this approach.
In light of the disastrous economic performance that accompanied the Smoot-
Hawley tariﬀs, Hull argued that an expansion in international trade was vital
for global economic recovery and prosperity. At a national level, it was also
recognized that an increase in U.S. exports was incompatible with a reduction
in U.S. imports. With these economic relationships in mind, Hull proposed that
the U.S. take the lead in negotiating reciprocal tariﬀ reductions with its trading
partners.19 At the same time, it was understood that reciprocal tariﬀ liberalization
had an appealing political by-product: the export-sector support for a reduction
in foreign tariﬀs would serve as a political counterweight against complaints from
the domestic import-competing sectors. The principle of non-discrimination then
served to provide breadth and speed to this liberalization program. In eﬀect, with
this principle, bilateral reciprocal tariﬀ reductions could be “multilateralized.”
By the 1940’s, the U.S. experiences with the bilateral trade agreements reached
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act had been quite successful, and the les-
son that reciprocal tariﬀ reductions could promote mutual gains had been learned.
The U.S. thus sought to establish a multilateral institution that would build upon
the essential components of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. In 1946, nego-
tiations began concerning the establishment of an International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO). The ITO would specify the rules under which multilateral negotiations
would proceed, as well as the manner in which these rules would be enforced. Tar-
iﬀs were to be lowered in reciprocal and mutually advantageous agreements, and
the reduced tariﬀs would then be extended to all member countries through the
non-discrimination principle. In 1947, an interim agreement was reached. This
agreement was known as the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT),
and it was drawn directly from ITO principles. While GATT was intended as an
interim agreement, the ITO was never ratified by the U.S. Congress, and so sub-
sequent multilateral negotiations were carried out within the GATT framework.20
19Hull eventually persuaded President Roosevelt to approach Congress with this plan. In a
message to the public on February 28, 1934, Roosevelt presented the case for reciprocity in the
following manner: “Full and permanent domestic recovery depends in part upon a revived and
strengthened international trade....American exports cannot be permanently increased without
a corresponding increase in imports.” (This quotation is found in Hull’s memoirs (1948, p. 357)
and Rhodes’ book (1993, p. 57)).
20Under the intellectual leadership of James Meade, Great Britain was also an active pro-
ponent of a multilateral trade institution. In fact, as Culbert (1987) explains, Meade drafted
a proposal for an “International Commercial Union” in 1942. While Meade also endorsed the
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As the Preamble of GATT states, the objectives of the contracting parties
include “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and eﬀective demand, developing the full
use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange
of goods.” The Preamble further states the participants’ belief that “reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction
in tariﬀs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce” would contribute toward the realization of
these goals. It is notable that “free trade” is nowhere mentioned as the objective
of GATT. Rather, the emphasis is on reciprocal tariﬀ reductions extended in a
non-discriminatory fashion in order that participating countries could mutually
benefit from the resulting increase in income. This emphasis on “reciprocity” and
“non-discrimination” has been maintained over GATT’s five-decade history.
Since GATT’s creation in 1947, there have been eight rounds of trade negoti-
ations. The earlier rounds focused primarily upon the reduction of import tariﬀs
on goods. By the mid-1980’s, import tariﬀs had been considerably reduced on
most goods. Still, important problems remained. First, there were some goods,
such as agriculture and textiles, for which the liberalization process had moved
slowly. Second, the treatment of many “new” trade-policy issues - preferential
trading agreements, labor and environmental standards, agricultural export sub-
sidies, and services, investment and intellectual property - is inadequate in GATT,
and these issues were seen as increasingly important for the global economy. Fi-
nally, GATT is an interim agreement, which “limped along for nearly fifty years
with almost no basic constitution designed to regulate its organizational activ-
ities and procedures” (Jackson, 1997, p. 42). The participating governments
thus sought to return to their original quest with the ITO and develop an oﬃcial
international organization.
These problems (and others, too) were addressed in the GATT Uruguay
Round, an ambitious and contentious round that lasted from 1986 to 1994. In
this round, governments achieved some success in the liberalization of agricul-
tural and textile goods, and they ventured into a number of new issues, including
those mentioned above. The Uruguay Round also resulted in the 1995 formation
principle of non-discrimination, he was less doctrinaire in this matter than was Hull. In par-
ticular, Meade favored the inclusion of a clause that allowed, at least to a moderate degree,
the continuation of the preferential trade agreements to which Great Britain already belonged.
This desire of Great Britain to maintain such agreements was strongly contested by the U.S..
Ultimately, as explained below, preferential trade agreements were permitted through Article
XXIV as an exception to GATT’s principle of non-discrimination.
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of the World Trade Organization (the WTO). This organization embraces the
rules and agreements made in the preceding GATT negotiations.21 But it is also
a full-fledged international organization, with an explicit organizational charter
that defines various committees, bodies and councils, as well as the duties of and
relationships between these groups. As we discuss further below, an important
innovation associated with the WTO is a unified dispute-settlement system.
3.2. The Rules of GATT
As we observe above, GATT is not simply the codification of the tariﬀ levels
negotiated by its member governments. Rather, membership in GATT carries
with it an obligation to abide by a set of rules under which future negotiations
can occur and future conduct will be judged (authoritative references on GATT
rules and procedures include Dam, 1970; Hudec, 1990; and Jackson, 1997). While
these rules are laid out in a series of 38 articles, it is often observed that the
pillars of GATT are the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN),
while enforcement mechanisms form the heart of the GATT system. We now
interpret these core concepts with reference to the rules of GATT. We divide
our discussion of these rules into three basic elements: substantive obligations,
permissible exceptions to those obligations and dispute settlement procedures.
3.2.1. Substantive Obligations
As Jackson (1997, pp. 51-52) explains, the substantive obligations contained in
GATT may be grouped into three categories: tariﬀ commitments (Articles II and
XXVIII bis.); most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment (Article I); and a series of
other commitments that together represent a “code of conduct” regarding gov-
ernment behavior in the international-trade arena (Articles III through XVII).22
At the broadest level, these provisions amount to an obligation to concentrate
national protective measures into the form of tariﬀs (and possibly subsidies), to
apply them on an MFN basis, and to honor any tariﬀ ceilings that are agreed to
21The WTO charter states in Article XVI:1 that the WTO “shall be guided by the decisions,
procedures and customary practices followed by” GATT 1947.
22This includes national treatment (Article III), anti-dumping and countervailing duties (Ar-
ticle VI), customs valuation and procedures (Articles VII, VIII and X), marks of origin (Article
IX), quantitative restrictions (Article XI), subsidies (Article XVI) and state-trading monopolies
(Article XVII).
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as “concessions” in a GATT negotiation. We focus here on the rules associated
with tariﬀ commitments and MFN.
Tariﬀ commitments made under GATT are in the form of “bindings,” with the
actual tariﬀ not to exceed the bound duty rate. As the discussion above suggests,
MFN treatment requires further that, for any member country and given good,
the member country does not discriminate with its import tariﬀ between exporters
from diﬀerent member countries (and any tariﬀ applied to exporters from non-
member countries cannot be lower); in addition, all tariﬀs of each member country
must conform to MFN regardless of whether these tariﬀs have been bound in a
GATT negotiation. There are also specific obligations that accompany a tariﬀ
binding that are meant to insure that the binding can not be undone by other
government measures, such as non-tariﬀ charges, new subsidies, or new methods
of classifying or valuing goods. Tariﬀ bindings can be altered through time, and
indeed GATT provides for its members to sponsor “rounds” of negotiations to
lower the general level of tariﬀ bindings “from time to time.” Within any such
round, a government oﬀers a reduction in its binding on a completely voluntary
basis, with the presumed goal of securing a mutually advantageous arrangement
through a reciprocal reduction in the tariﬀ bindings of its trading partners.
3.2.2. Exceptions
While the substantive obligations of GATT represent an attempt at the interna-
tional level to restrain incentives for trade intervention that may exist at the
national level, countries are not held rigidly to these “obligations.” Instead,
GATT provides for various exceptions that can be invoked in certain circum-
stances. Broadly speaking, exceptions can take two forms. First, an exception
can be granted to a country for an “original” action. For example, GATT rules
permit exceptions to tariﬀ commitments that are associated with opportunities
for (i). the renegotiation and modification of tariﬀ schedules (Article XXVIII),
and (ii). the suspension of concessions made under the escape clause (Article
XIX). We discuss the specific provisions associated with each of these possibilities
in subsequent sections. GATT rules also permit an exception to MFN treatment
for the purpose of negotiating preferential trade agreements (Article XXIV).
The permissiveness with which GATT grants exceptions for original actions
by member countries suggest that GATT “obligations” are not what they might
appear, and indeed they are not. Dam (1970, p. 80) explains the rationale for
the inclusion of such exceptions:
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“The GATT has a special interest in seeing that as many agreements for the reduc-
tion of tariﬀs as possible are made. Enforcement of bindings is important in the GATT
insofar as such enforcement gives contracting parties the confidence necessary to rely
upon tariﬀ concessions oﬀered by other contracting parties. But because of the economic
nature of tariﬀ concessions and the domestic political sensitivity inherently involved in
trade issues, a system that made withdrawals of concessions impossible would tend to
discourage the making of concessions in the first place. It is better, for example, that
100 commitments should be made and that 10 should be withdrawn than that only 50
commitments should be made and that all of them should be kept.”
Exceptions for original actions thus act as “safeguards” that are designed to en-
courage tariﬀ commitments and confidence in the GATT system.23
Of course, exceptions for original actions must be subjected to some disciplin-
ing structure; otherwise, governments might abuse the permissive posture and
claim exceptional circumstances on too frequent a basis. GATT rules therefore
also permit a second kind of exception, which is granted to member countries for
“retaliatory” actions. For example, when a government seeks to modify or with-
draw a previous concession, GATT rules recognize the consequent cost borne by
the trading partner that is the “principal supplier” of the relevant good. If this
trading partner is unable to negotiate satisfactory “compensation” (e.g., the gov-
ernment may oﬀer to compensate for its original action by reducing the tariﬀ on
some other good), then it is allowed to achieve that compensation through retali-
ation: in other words, the trading partner can then reciprocate by withdrawing a
concession of a “substantially equivalent” nature. Thus, as a general matter, the
temptation that a government may have to request exceptions for original actions
is tempered by the permitted responses of its trading partners, who are allowed
to seek compensation by retaliating with reciprocal adjustments of their own.
Taken together, GATT’s substantive obligations and its permitted exceptions
to those obligations define a set of rules under which GATTmembers are expected
to abide. Within this set of rules, it is then up to each member government
to decide whether and when to engage in negotiations with any other member
government, and any bargains struck are implemented subject to these rules. We
consider next the manner in which these rules are enforced.
23Ostry (1997, p. 68) reaches a similar conclusion. She explains the purpose of exceptions
as follows: “These exceptions were considered essential as a means of promoting liberalization,
for in the absence of legitimate ‘escapes,’ governments would be reluctant to undertake any
significant reduction of trade barriers.”
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3.2.3. Dispute Settlement Procedures
When a government makes a tariﬀ commitment as part of a GATT negotiation, is
it then compelled under its domestic law to honor that commitment? As Jackson
(1997, pp. 79-105) details, the relationship between international and domestic
law varies from country to country. In the U.S., the authority to enter into trade
agreements is granted by the legislative to the executive branch, and the conditions
under which this authority is granted influence the domestic legal standing of the
corresponding trade agreement. According to Jackson (1997, pp. 96-97), the
key parts of GATT and also the WTO agreements reached in the Uruguay Round
appear not to be “self-executing,” which is to say that such agreements do not have
full standing as domestic law without further governmental acts. As Low (1993,
p. 48) explains, this has the practical implication that “nothing in U.S. domestic
law...prevents the president from subsequently violating U.S. tariﬀ commitments
under GATT...In practice, this means that the status of the GATT and associated
agreements under U.S. law gives virtually limitless potential in U.S. trade policy
for noncompliance with GATT.”24
This discussion raises an obvious, but fundamental, question: By what means
are GATT commitments enforced? As no external enforcement mechanism exists
to punish GATT violations, meaningful commitments must be self-enforcing, with
violations deterred by the credible threat of subsequent retaliation. The general
argument is nicely summarized by Dam (1970, pp. 80-81):
“The best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept (particularly in an
international setting where courts are of limited importance and, even more important,
marshals and jails are nonexistent) is that the parties continue to view adherence to
their agreement as in their mutual interest...
“Thus, the GATT system, unlike most legal systems,..., is not designed to exclude
self-help in the form of retaliation. Rather, retaliation, subjected to established proce-
dures and kept within prescribed bounds, is made the heart of the GATT system.”
The dispute settlement and enforcement provisions contained within GATT itself
are thus essential to the functioning of the multilateral trading system.
The central components of the GATT dispute settlement system evolved through
GATT practice with reference to the provisions contained in Articles XXII and
24For further discussion of the domestic legal standing of GATT commitments, see also Dam
(1970) and Hudec (1990).
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XXIII. Article XXII calls for bilateral consultations when disputes arise, while Ar-
ticle XXIII (“Nullification or Impairment”) is the real centerpiece of the GATT
dispute settlement process, as it defines the circumstances under which the ac-
tions by one country serve to “nullify or impair” the benefits expected under the
agreement by another country. Nullification or impairment has been interpreted
to include actions taken by one country “...which harmed the trade of another,
and which ‘could not reasonably have been anticipated’ by the other at the time
it negotiated for a concession” (Jackson, 1997, p. 115). As Petersmann (1997)
details, a nullification-or-impairment complaint may take several forms. A “vi-
olation complaint” occurs when a country is alleged to have failed to carry out
its GATT obligations (as when a tariﬀ binding is broken), while a “non-violation
complaint” occurs when there is no claim that the harmful action is itself incon-
sistent with GATT rules (as when a production subsidy is oﬀered to domestic
firms). In GATT practice, over 90% of the disputes filed under Article XXIII
have been violation complaints.25
An important distinction can be drawn between the procedures associated
with “safeguard” exceptions as discussed above and those that are typically asso-
ciated with nullification or impairment. The safeguards contained in Articles XIX
and XXVIII provide for the lawful suspension, modification or withdrawal of pre-
viously negotiated concessions and spell out the permissible retaliatory responses
of trading partners. Governments behave in a “GATT-legal” fashion when they
act within the confines of these rules. By contrast, Articles XXII and XXIII de-
scribe the procedures for retaliating against a country that takes a harmful action
which its trading partners could not have anticipated under GATT rules. In the
typical case, that of a violation complaint, the actions of the oﬀending country
have violated GATT rules, and retaliation here is more fundamentally concerned
with the enforcement of rules.
The GATT procedure for settling disputes involves three stages: consultation
between or among the parties in the dispute; investigation, ruling and recom-
mendation by a GATT panel; and as a last resort, authorization for one or more
25The circumstances under which an action is interpreted to have nullified or impaired the
expected benefits of another country are somewhat ambiguous, and the evolution of GATT
practice has therefore led to the identification of three conditions for a prima facie finding of
nullification or impairment: the breach of an obligation, the use of a domestic subsidy to inhibit
imports in certain cases, and the use of quantitative restrictions. The burden of proof that
no nullification or impairment occurred then falls on the country which breached or took such
actions (Jackson, 1997, p. 115). The first condition corresponds to a violation complaint, but
the other two conditions can arise without any explicit violation of GATT rules.
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countries to suspend GATT obligations against another (i.e., retaliation). In prac-
tice, the greatest emphasis has been placed on consultation and negotiation rather
than on retaliation. Resolution is sometimes achieved in the first stage, and on
other occasions it follows the GATT panel ruling. When the panel finds that nul-
lification or impairment has occurred, it recommends that the oﬀending country
bring its illegal measures into conformity with GATT rules. If the oﬀending coun-
try is unwilling to do so, then it may seek a negotiated resolution by oﬀering to
“compensate” the harmed country with a reduction in its (MFN) tariﬀ on other
goods. As Petersmann (1997, pp. 80-82) explains, compensation is voluntary un-
der GATT, but it is often used to forestall the last-resort response: an authorized
(and discriminatory) suspension of tariﬀ concessions by the harmed country.
In practice, retaliation under Article XXIII has been authorized only in a few
cases.26 There have been several attempts to seek authorized retaliation, however,
and at times GATT disputes have resulted in unauthorized retaliation. Further-
more, other disputes between GATT members have occurred outside GATT pro-
cedures entirely (Kovenock and Thursby, 1992). As Rhodes (1993, p. 109) argues,
while the number of authorized retaliations is small, the threat of authorized retal-
iation is often the catalyst that ensures resolution in the consultation/negotiation
stage. This reflects a theme that emerges from the drafting history of Article
XXIII. The drafters of Article XXIII clearly understood the necessity of the re-
taliatory threat, but they sought as well to construct a rule-based system under
which retaliation is limited in frequency and scope.27
With the WTO, the member governments significantly strengthened the dis-
pute settlement procedures. While the GATT dispute settlement process evolved
over time from an initial beginning of a few paragraphs in GATT 1947, the WTO
dispute settlement process is elaborately defined so as to construct a unified pro-
cedure that permits application to both traditional and new trade-policy issues.
In this context, one important innovation is that the ability of a single country
26Retaliation was authorized under GATT only in one case, concerning the use by the U.S. of
import restraints on dairy products from the Netherlands. For seven years, The Netherlands was
authorized to utilize import restraints on U.S. grain, but it never acted on that authorization
(Jackson, 1997, p. 116). More recently, under the WTO, further cases have emerged in which
retaliation has been authorized (and used). The U.S. and Ecuador were authorized to retaliate
against the E.U. in response to discriminatory tariﬀs adopted by the E.U. on banana imports,
and the U.S. was authorized to retaliate against the E.U. in response to the E.U. prohibition
of imports of hormone-treated beef. Additionally, Canada was authorized to retaliate against
Brazil as a consequence of Brazil’s failure to remove illegal aircraft subsidies.
27We develop these points further in Section 6.1.
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to “block” a panel’s ruling is now eliminated.28 A second important innovation is
that the WTO has a Trade Policy Review Body, which conducts regular reviews
of individual countries’ trade policies. These trade policy reviews represent an
explicit attempt on the part of the WTO members to monitor one another’s trade
policies and thereby enhance “transparency,” so as to encourage governments to
follow more closely WTO rules and to fulfill the obligations to which they have
agreed under these rules.
3.3. Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Enforcement under GATT
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that the enforcement provi-
sions are a central feature of GATT rules, as is the principle of non-discrimination
(MFN). The representation of the principle of reciprocity in these rules, however,
is much less clear. Yet, along with the principle of non-discrimination, the prin-
ciple of reciprocity is widely recognized as a pillar of GATT. How is the principle
of reciprocity represented in GATT?
Broadly speaking, the principle of reciprocity in GATT refers to the “ideal”
of mutual changes in trade policy which bring about changes in the volume of
each country’s imports that are of equal value to changes in the volume of its
exports. Upon closer examination, the preceding discussion contains two impor-
tant instances in which a reference to reciprocity arises. First, when governments
negotiate in GATT rounds as allowed under Article XXVIII bis, they do so with
the presumed goal of securing a mutually advantageous arrangement through a
reciprocal reduction in tariﬀ bindings, and they seek a “balance of concessions” in
their negotiations. In this case, reciprocity refers broadly to the philosophy with
which governments approach negotiations.29 Second, when a government seeks to
modify or withdraw a previous concession as an original action, Article XXVIII
28Under the GATT dispute settlement process, the approval of the panel’s ruling required
consensus among member countries, and so it was possible for the country losing a case to block
the adoption of the ruling. By contrast, under the new WTO dispute settlement process, the
panel’s ruling is “automatic,” in the sense that it can be blocked only if there is consensus among
the member countries that the ruling should be rejected. The panel finding may be appealed,
however, in which case an Appellate Body of three experts evaluates the dispute and the panel
ruling. The appellate report is also adopted in “automatic” fashion. As well, under the WTO
approach, all stages of the dispute settlement process are subject to fixed timetables, ensuring
a timely resolution.
29For a discussion of the concept of reciprocity in GATT negotiations, as well as the ways
in which reciprocity has been measured in practice, see Dam (1970, pp. 58-61 and pp. 87-91),
Enders (1997) and Hoekman and Kostecki (1995, pp. 68-76). See also footnotes 31 and 33.
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requires moderation in the retaliatory response of the aﬀected trading partners,
who are allowed to reciprocate by withdrawing “substantially equivalent conces-
sions.”30 Thus, both when tariﬀs are being lowered in negotiation rounds and
being raised as part of a renegotiation process, the principle of reciprocity implies
a “balance” in the commercial treatment between GATT members.
This completes our general discussion of the history and design of GATT and
the WTO. At this point, we are prepared to return to the theoretical framework
developed in Section 2 and summarized in Figure 3. Within this setting, we
investigate whether the rules of GATT assist governments as they attempt to
navigate their way from the ineﬃcient Nash point to the contract curve. At various
points in our discussion, some further clarification of GATT rules is required. We
present these additional remarks in the company of the corresponding theoretical
analysis. This serves both to promote a broad perspective of GATT in the present
section and to make subsequent sections more self-contained. We begin in the next
section with a theoretical analysis of reciprocity.
4. Reciprocity
Our purpose in this section is to oﬀer an assessment of reciprocity as a principle
that assists governments as they attempt to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Building on the general discussion of reciprocity presented
in the previous section, we develop below a more detailed description of the role of
reciprocity in GATT. We distinguish between the two ways in which reciprocity
appears in GATT practice, and we then evaluate the economic logic of reciprocity.
Finally, we return to the theme of rules-based versus power-based negotiations
discussed above, and we discuss a broader interpretation of reciprocity as a means
to bring “weaker” countries into the multilateral trading system.
4.1. Reciprocity in GATT
As mentioned above, the term “reciprocity” refers broadly to the ideal of mutual
changes in trade policy which bring about changes in the volume of each country’s
30This second application of reciprocity comes up also in GATT’s Article XIX, which provides
for the temporary suspension of tariﬀ commitments in response to injurious import increases,
and as we discuss in Section 6.1 it can arise as well under Article XXIII. The application to
Article XIX has been altered with the creation of the WTO, however, as we discuss further in
Section 6.2.1.
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imports that are of equal value to changes in the volume of its exports.31 We
begin by noting that the concept of reciprocity can be given a simple formal
representation. Utilizing the two-country model of trade presented in Section
2 and following Bagwell and Staiger (1999a), we define reciprocity formally as
follows: a set of tariﬀ changes ∆τ ≡ (τ1 − τ 0) and ∆τ ∗ ≡ (τ ∗1 − τ∗0)) conforms
to the principle of reciprocity if
epw0[Mx(p(τ1, epw1), epw1)−Mx(p(τ 0, epw0), epw0)]
= [Ey(p(τ
1, epw1), epw1)− Ey(p(τ 0, epw0), epw0)]
where epw0 ≡ epw0(τ0, τ ∗0), epw1 ≡ epw1(τ 1, τ∗1) and changes in trade volumes are
valued at the existing world price. An analogous (and redundant) condition holds,
under reciprocity, for the foreign country. We now use the trade balance condition
(2.1) to rewrite this expression as
[epw1 − epw0]Mx(p(τ1, epw1), epw1) = 0. (4.1)
Thus, as (4.1) makes clear, mutual changes in trade policy that conform to the
principle of reciprocity leave the world price unchanged. The potential importance
of this property becomes apparent, when it is recalled from our previous review of
the traditional economic and political-economy theories of trade agreements that
a government sets its tariﬀs in an ineﬃcient manner if and only if it is motivated
by the change in the world price that its tariﬀ choice implies.32
With a formal definition of the principle of reciprocity now at hand, we con-
sider the application of this principle within GATT practice. As suggested in
Section 3.3, reciprocity arises in GATT practice in two ways. First, the principle
31In fact, nowhere in GATT is the term reciprocity specifically defined. Perhaps the clear-
est statement was given by the Legal Advisor to GATT’s Director-General (GATT document
C/M/220, pp. 35-36), as quoted in the context of Article XXVIII renegotiations in WTO
(1995). In describing the “fairly well established criteria” that were considered in determining
what would constitute the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions, it was noted that:
“The first criterion was the development of the imports during, normally, the three years before
the renegotiations started. What was taken into account was not just a statistical average, but
also the trend in the development of trade during that period. Furthermore, account was taken
of the size of the tariﬀ increase being negotiated. Moreover, an estimate was made of the price
elasticity of the product concerned.” (WTO, 1995, p. 949). See also Enders (1997).
32While we have derived this property of reciprocity within the two-good two-country frame-
work presented in Section 2 above, it also extends naturally to a many-good many-country
setting (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a).
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of reciprocity is often associated with the manner in which government negotia-
tors approach trade negotiations. A common perception is that governments enter
into negotiations seeking a “balance of concessions,” whereby the tariﬀ reduction
oﬀered by one government is balanced against an “equivalent” concession from its
trading partner.33 The emphasis that governments place upon reciprocity in this
sense has attracted the interest of many economists, as it stands in sharp contrast
to standard economic arguments in favor of unilateral liberalization. We therefore
consider next in Section 4.2 an economic interpretation of this application of reci-
procity. A second application of the principle of reciprocity can be found within
the actual articles of GATT itself. This application concerns the manner in which
governments may renegotiate agreements. While economists have traditionally
placed less emphasis on this application of reciprocity, GATT legal scholars rou-
tinely point out its potential significance (see, for example, Dam, 1970, pp. 79-99;
and Jackson, 1997, p. 143). We discuss this application in Section 4.3.
4.2. Reciprocity and Trade Negotiations
The first application of reciprocity in GATT practice reflects the balance of con-
cessions that governments seek through a negotiated agreement. This practice is
described by Dam (1970, p. 59), who explains that, under the language of Article
XXVIII bis that outlines the manner in which GATT tariﬀ negotiations are to
occur, negotiations are voluntary and are to be conducted on a “reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis.” Dam (1970, p. 59) explains further that:
“This permissive approach to the content of tariﬀ agreements is often referred to
under the heading of reciprocity. From the legal principle that a country need make
concessions only when other contracting parties oﬀer reciprocal concessions considered
to be ‘mutually advantageous’ has been derived the informal principle that exchanges
of concessions must entail reciprocity.”
This informal principle of reciprocity stands in contrast to standard economic
logic, which implies that optimal unilateral policy for a country is free trade. From
33For example, Preeg (1970, pp. 130-134) remarks that in the GATT Kennedy Round, nego-
tiators sought to achieve a balance in value between the forecasted increases in the volume of
imports and the estimated increase in the volume of exports that would accompany a proposed
set of tariﬀ concessions. This observed practice of reciprocity in negotiation fits squarely with
the formal definition of reciprocity presented above. Bhagwati (1988, 1991) also notes that
reciprocity in tariﬀ negotiations is defined with reference to a balance in the value of changes in
trade volume, referring to this process as first-diﬀerence reciprocity.
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this perspective, it is perplexing that a government would require a “concession”
from its trading partner in order to do what is in any event best for its country.
Appealing to this apparent violation of economic logic, many economists interpret
the observation that governments seek reciprocity in negotiated agreements as
direct evidence that government negotiators adopt a mercantilist perspective that
is incompatible with basic economic reasoning and that therefore derives from
underlying political forces. For example, Krugman (1991, p. 25) observes:
“To make sense of international trade negotiations, one needs to remember three
simple rules about the objectives of negotiating countries:
1). Exports are good.
2). Imports are bad.
3). Other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good.
In other words, GATT-think is enlightened mercantilism.”
Against this backdrop, it can now be argued that the mercantilist approach to
trade negotiations that seems to drive actual negotiations admits a simple eco-
nomic interpretation.34
To see this, suppose that governments begin at the Nash equilibrium point.
Appealing to (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8), at the Nash equilibrium it is true that Wp <
0 < W ∗p∗ . This means that if governments could agree to liberalize tariﬀs in a
reciprocal manner that preserved the world price, then the domestic local price p
would fall (since ∂p/∂τ = epw > 0) and the foreign local price p∗ would rise (since
∂p∗/∂τ ∗ = −(epw)/(τ∗)2 < 0), and as a consequence the domestic-government
welfare would rise (since Wp < 0) and the foreign-government welfare would also
rise (since W ∗p∗ > 0). The simple point is that at the Nash equilibrium both
governments would prefer more trade, if the increase in trade volume could be
obtained without a deterioration in the terms of trade. A unilateral liberalization
eﬀort would indeed result in a decline in the terms of trade, and so neither govern-
ment would seek unilateral liberalization. On the other hand, if the liberalization
occurs under the principle of reciprocity, with one country’s tariﬀ reduction bal-
anced against that of the other, then the terms of trade are held constant and each
34The main argument is developed more fully in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a). The view that
GATT negotiations are incompatible with economic reasoning and instead reflect mercantilist
logic is further developed by Krugman in his more recent paper (Krugman, 1997). Some of
the advantages of reciprocity described by Bhagwati (1991, pp. 50-51), Gilligan (1997) and
McMillan (1986, 1989) are more in line with the results we report here.
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government can gain from an expansion in trade volume without experiencing a
consequent decline in the terms of trade.
Reciprocal liberalization of this nature is sure to increase the welfare of both
governments if they start at the Nash equilibrium. In fact, beginning at the
Nash equilibrium, reciprocal liberalization that leaves the world price unchanged
increases each government’s welfare monotonically until this liberalization has
proceeded to the point where one government has achieved its preferred local price
(given the Nash world price). If the domestic government achieves its preferred
local price first, then mutually beneficial liberalization proceeds until Wp = 0,
and similarly this liberalization continues until W ∗p∗ = 0 if the foreign government
first achieves its preferred local price. A case of particular interest arises when
the domestic and foreign countries are symmetric. In this case, liberalization that
preserves world prices raises the welfare of both governments monotonically until
the single tariﬀ pair is reached at which Wp = 0 = W ∗p∗. That is to say, when
countries are symmetric and liberalize according to the principle of reciprocity,
the liberalization process leads to the politically optimal tariﬀs.
Drawing from the perspective of the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade
theory, in which governments seek an escape from a terms-of-trade-driven Pris-
oners’ Dilemma, it is therefore possible to oﬀer a formal economic interpretation
of the apparent mercantilist behavior that seems to characterize actual trade ne-
gotiations. Just as Krugman’s (1991) three rules of “enlightened mercantilism”
would suggest, this perspective implies that governments have every reason to be-
lieve that “exports are good,” since a reduction in the import tariﬀ levied by the
trading partner serves to improve the terms of trade. In addition, governments
naturally regard import liberalization as a concession, with the broader implica-
tion that “imports are bad,” because unilateral liberalization entails reducing the
import tariﬀ below the best-response value and suﬀering a terms-of-trade decline.
Finally, each government benefits from a concession at home that is balanced un-
der reciprocity against an “equivalent” concession abroad, so that “other things
equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good,” since the balance of
concessions so achieved serves to neutralize the terms-of-trade decline that would
have made unilateral liberalization undesirable.
Recalling now the discussion of the origin of GATT presented in Section 3,
we note that the interpretation of reciprocity developed here is in some respects
a formal confirmation of the economic benefits associated with reciprocity that
Hull suggested. It is also interesting to contrast this explanation of reciprocity
with a seemingly separate political argument. As Hull recognized, a practical
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benefit of reciprocal (as opposed to unilateral) liberalization is that the reduction
in the foreign import tariﬀ mobilizes political support among domestic exporters
that acts as a counterweight against the objections to liberalization that arise
from domestic import-competing firms. It is clear, however, that the proposed
export-sector support for reciprocity ultimately must derive from the anticipated
economic benefit that is associated with a reduction in the foreign tariﬀ. This ben-
efit, moreover, travels through the improved world price that domestic exporters
can expect to receive. Consequently, the foreign tariﬀ reduction benefits domes-
tic exporters by contributing to an improvement in the domestic terms of trade.
Evidently, this “political” explanation of reciprocity can in fact be oﬀered within
the (politically-augmented) terms-of-trade theory; furthermore, it then becomes
apparent that the ability of reciprocity to neutralize the adverse terms-of-trade
implications of unilateral liberalization is the essence of this explanation as well.35
At the same time, it should be noted that a more sophisticated political ar-
gument for reciprocity also exists. This argument is developed in some detail by
Gilligan (1997), who notes that the benefit to domestic exporters of a foreign tariﬀ
reduction is transmitted through an improved world price.36 He then goes further
to oﬀer an interpretation of the political aspects of reciprocity that highlights
a dynamic process through which government preferences change over time. As
Gilligan (1997, p. 35) puts it, “Reciprocity really created a ‘friendly cycle’ of lib-
eralization: each round of trade agreements encouraged more exporter lobbying,
and, as more exporters became politically active, legislatures became willing to
allow deeper reductions in protection.”
Krishna and Mitra (1999) explore a formal version of this process. In their
model, the domestic country first sets its import tariﬀ, and this selection alters
the world price and thereby aﬀects the incentives of private actors in the foreign
country, who must decide whether to incur the fixed costs that are associated with
forming a lobby. Lobbies can be formed in the import-competing sector or the
exporting sector. Once the lobby structure is determined, the game within the
foreign country proceeds as in the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model: the schedule
of lobby contributions is presented to the government, who then selects its import
tariﬀ to maximize its welfare function.37 There is an interesting analogy here to
35Recall from Section 2 that the model developed here can include a political-support con-
straint.
36Bhagwati (1991, pp. 50-51) also discusses some of the political advantages of reciprocity.
37Krishna and Mitra (1999) build oﬀ of Mitra (1999), who introduces to the Grossman-
Helpman (1994) model a fixed cost for lobby formation and endogenizes the structure of lobbies.
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the commitment approach described in Section 2.1.4. In the Krishna-Mitra model,
the private-sector “investment” corresponds to the fixed costs that are associated
with the endogenous formation of lobbies. The novel wrinkle, though, is that the
government of the domestic country may oﬀer a low tariﬀ, in order to influence
the commitment game between the foreign government and its private sector. In
particular, the domestic government seeks to steer lobby formation in the foreign
country away from the import sector and toward the export sector, since this in
turn induces the foreign government to oﬀer a low tariﬀ.
This suggests that unilateral trade liberalization may be desirable, because
of the subsequent reciprocal tariﬀ liberalization that it induces. As such, this
argument oﬀers an interesting interpretation of important historic episodes of
unilateral liberalization (e.g., the unilateral repeal of England’s Corn Laws in the
1840’s). The argument may also contribute toward an improved understanding of
the gradual process through which tariﬀ liberalization has occurred (as discussed
further in Section 6.2.2). But the argument succeeds less well in directly account-
ing for the rules described by Krugman, which pertain to negotiations between
trading partners who seek simultaneous reciprocal tariﬀ liberalization.
4.3. Reciprocity and Renegotiation
While the application of reciprocity considered above reflects the broad manner
in which governments appear to approach trade negotiations, there is in fact
no requirement in GATT that negotiations proceed in this manner. There is,
however, a second application of the principle of reciprocity in GATT, and in this
application GATT rules do require reciprocity. This second application concerns
the manner in which trade agreements may be renegotiated. Under GATT Article
XXVIII, a country may propose to modify or withdraw a concession agreed upon
in a previous round of negotiation. In this case, if the country and its trading
partner are unable to reach agreement regarding a renegotiated tariﬀ structure,
then the country is free to carry out the proposed changes anyway, and the notion
of reciprocity is used to moderate the response of the country’s trading partner,
who is permitted to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions of its own.38
This suggests that GATT negotiations may be understood as a multi-stage
game, in which governments first agree to an initial set of tariﬀs in a round
38For further discussion of Article XXVIII and the GATT rules that govern renegotiation, see
Dam (1970, pp. 79-99), Enders (1997) and Jackson (1997, p. 143). Bagwell and Staiger (1999a)
provide a formal analysis of reciprocity and renegotiation along the lines discussed here.
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of negotiations under Article XXVIII bis, and then each government considers
whether it would prefer to raise its tariﬀ with the understanding that the outcome
of any Article XXVIII renegotiation that follows will, under GATT’s reciprocity
rule, preserve the world price implied by the original negotiation. Viewed from
this perspective, it is clear that governments must evaluate the future incentives
for renegotiation that might accompany a proposed initial agreement. A figure
can capture some of the key ideas.
Consider then Figure 5. This figure depicts three possible tariﬀ pairs that
might represent an initial agreement. These tariﬀ pairs are represented as points
A, B and PO and, to make the argument as clear as possible, we suppose that
each of the tariﬀ pairs is on the eﬃciency locus. Figure 5 also depicts the iso-
world-price loci that run through each of the candidate tariﬀ pairs. Finally, the
loci for which Wp = 0 and W ∗p∗ = 0, respectively, are also represented. These
loci are assumed downward sloping, although the argument developed here is not
limited to this assumption. According to (2.10), each locus intersects the eﬃciency
frontier at the politically optimal point PO and nowhere else.39
Consider first an initial agreement that corresponds to point A. Observe in
this case that the foreign government would prefer to move up the associated iso-
world-price locus to the point A0, where it achieves its preferred local price (given
the world price determined at point A). Thus, while the tariﬀ pair at point A is
eﬃcient, it is not robust to the type of renegotiation that GATT allows through
Article XXVIII. The foreign government would request a renegotiation to raise its
tariﬀ to the value corresponding to point A0, knowing that the domestic govern-
ment would then be permitted under Article XXVIII to withdraw a substantially
equivalent concession that would preserve the world price and therefore deliver
the tariﬀ pair at point A0. A similar argument applies for the eﬃcient tariﬀ pair
associated with point B, except in this case it is the domestic government that
first withdraws its original concession in order to induce the point B0. Reasoning
in this fashion, it is now direct to see that there is only one eﬃcient tariﬀ pair
which, if agreed to originally, would not be lost in the renegotiation process. This
tariﬀ pair is the politically optimal tariﬀ pair, since this is the only point on the
eﬃciency locus at which both governments achieve their preferred local prices
given the associated world price.40
39As (2.10) indicates, eﬃciency is possible if and only if both Wp = 0 and W ∗p∗ = 0 (corre-
sponding to the politically optimal point) or both Wp 6= 0 and W ∗p∗ 6= 0.
40Recall that the iso-welfare curves of each government are tangent to the iso-world-price locus
at the politically optimal tariﬀs. In the special case of national-welfare-maximizing governments
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The logic embodied in Figure 5 suggests that the principle of reciprocity as
it applies to renegotiations of GATT agreements can allow governments to reach
the eﬃciency locus. On the other hand, not every set of tariﬀs on the eﬃciency
locus is compatible with the ability to renegotiate as allowed under the principle of
reciprocity. In fact, as Figure 5 implies, the politically optimal tariﬀs are the only
eﬃcient tariﬀs that are “renegotiation-proof” in this sense. From the perspective
of the (politically augmented) terms-of-trade theory, there is a certain appeal to
this finding, since the politically optimal tariﬀs are also those tariﬀs which arise
when the source of ineﬃciency - governments’ motivations to influence the terms-
of-trade - is directly eliminated.
As the political optimum represents the only eﬃcient outcome that survives
renegotiation under GATT’s reciprocity rule, the set of outcomes that are renegotiation-
proof in this environment rest inside the eﬃciency frontier except at the political
optimum. An implication is that governments are “penalized” under GATT’s
reciprocity rule if they seek to negotiate an outcome on the eﬃciency frontier
other than the political optimum. For example, at point A in Figure 5, notice
that the home government achieves higher welfare than it would obtain at the
political optimum. However, a portion of the gains which the home government
might achieve in pushing the negotiations away from the political optimum and
toward point A would be lost under GATT’s reciprocity rule in the subsequent
renegotiation to the point A0, and the home government may therefore be less
apt to push the negotiations in this direction. A similar observation applies to
the foreign government with reference to the point B. In this way, GATT’s reci-
procity rule can be viewed as helping to mitigate the power asymmetries that
governments might otherwise wield at the bargaining table, as this rule serves to
direct them toward the political optimum, an outcome that is defined without
reference to countries’ relative power status.41 This observation is in line with the
our discussion in Section 2.2 above regarding the nature of rules-based approaches
associated with the traditional economic approach depicted in Figure 1, the political optimum
corresponds to reciprocal free trade and the locus at which the domestic (foreign) government
achieves its preferred local price is horizontal (vertical) out of the reciprocal-free-trade point. The
eﬃciency locus passes through this point as well, but it otherwise lies below the loci associated
with the preferred local prices. Thus, when governments maximize national welfare, the point
of reciprocal free trade is the only point on the eﬃciency locus that can survive renegotiation
under GATT’s reciprocity rules.
41Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) define a “Bilateral Negotiation Game” and show for this game
that reciprocity guides negotiations toward the politically optimal outcome, unless suﬃcient
asymmetries are present.
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to negotiations, but it does raise an important new question: Why would powerful
countries agree to participate in GATT under the rule of reciprocity? We consider
this question next.
4.4. Reciprocity and Participation: Rules versus Power
In Section 2.2 we illustrate how a power-based approach to trade negotiations
could allow governments to move to a point on the contract curve. Any diﬀerence
between the negotiated outcome and the political optimum would then reflect
“power asymmetries” across negotiating partners. In Section 4.3 we argue that
GATT’s reciprocity rule serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries
on negotiated outcomes. The reciprocity rules thereby guides negotiating govern-
ments back toward the political optimum. Why, then, would powerful countries
support a multilateral system built on the pillar of reciprocity, when evidently
this pillar serves to undercut their bargaining advantage?
At a broad level, the question of why powerful governments submit to a rules-
based system is a fundamental question of international relations, and we do not
presume to provide a complete answer here. We do, however, oﬀer a partial
answer: by serving to moderate the lawful response of powerful countries in case
of disagreement, GATT’s rule of reciprocity may encourage weaker countries to
overcome their fear of exploitation by stronger trading partners and participate
in GATT negotiations.42
The general idea draws from the commitment approach described in Section
2.1.4, and McLaren’s (1997) model suggests an especially interesting version. Let
us suppose that the government of a smaller country were to contemplate entering
into tariﬀ negotiations with a large trading partner. As news of the negotiations
spread, a process might naturally begin in which producers in the smaller country
raced to make investments to position themselves so as to serve the large foreign
market once trade barriers had been reduced. Such investments, however, once
sunk, would tend to undercut the position of the smaller country’s government at
42The notion that a rules-based institution can assist small countries is advanced on the WTO
web cite (http://www.wto.org/wto/about/devel5.htm), where the importance of trade rules for
small- and medium-sized countries is explained as follows: “The WTO provides a rules-based
multilateral trading system. All members have both rights and obligations. The alternative is
bilateral commercial relations based on economic and political power - small countries are then
at the mercy of the large trading powers. Diﬀerences in influence between individual countries
remain, of course, but even the smallest WTO member has a wide range of rights which are
enforceable under the WTO’s impartial dispute settlement procedures.”
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the bargaining table, as a breakdown in negotiations would now be quite costly
for the smaller country. As a result, the government of the smaller country might
well be “held up” at the bargaining table, and pushed by its larger trading partner
into accepting terms that make it worse oﬀ than if negotiations had never begun.
Anticipating this possibility, the government of the smaller country may be espe-
cially cautious about engaging in any trade negotiations with its larger trading
partners, and potential eﬃciency gains from negotiations may remain unexploited.
It is in such a situation that prior commitments to a set of rules by which sub-
sequent negotiations must abide could provide eﬃciency gains, as a commitment
to rules could solve the “hold up” problem, and thereby serve the objectives of all
governments by encouraging smaller countries to participate in negotiations with
their more powerful trading partners. In particular, GATT’s reciprocity rule can
help to serve this purpose, as it can insure weaker countries against the possibility
of exploitation by guiding negotiations toward the political optimum.43
5. MFN
Does the principle of MFN assist governments as they attempt to escape from a
terms-of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma? In this section we consider this ques-
tion. We begin with a general discussion of MFN in GATT, and in particular of
the diﬃculty in providing a formal rationale for MFN in bargaining environments.
We then outline an extension of our general equilibrium modeling framework that
allows for multiple countries, so that we may consider the role of MFN in a multi-
country setting, and we argue that the case for MFN in GATT can be seen most
clearly when it is viewed in the company of GATT’s principle of reciprocity.
5.1. MFN in GATT
As the discussion in Section 3 indicates, MFN is a pillar of the multilateral trading
system under GATT, and yet an account of the central benefits of MFN has largely
eluded formal analysis. The diﬃculty in providing a formal rationale for MFN
arises from several sources.
43See Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) for a full treatment of reciprocity as a means to induce
participation along the lines outlined above. A similar hold-up problem can be generated using
the political-economy model of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), which allows that voter preferences
may change through time.
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On the one hand, the principle of MFN carries with it potential costs associated
with “free riding” on the bargaining outcomes of others, and these costs have been
emphasized since the work of Viner (1924, 1931, 1936). The free-rider eﬀects
associated with MFN are formalized in a bargaining framework by Caplin and
Krishna (1988), who highlight the externality that MFN creates across bargaining
pairs and argue that this ability to free ride can prevent governments from reaching
the eﬃciency frontier. Ludema (1991) extends the analysis to allow each country
the subsequent ability to disapprove any agreement negotiated by its government
before the agreement can come into force. This ratification process has the eﬀect
of reducing the ability of any government to free ride on the agreements of others
via the MFN clause, and so can be seen as a way to minimize the free-rider costs
associated with MFN. Nevertheless, the free-rider issues associated with MFN
raise a potentially important cost associated with the adoption of this principle.
On the other hand, the potential benefits of the principle of MFN are less easily
identified. As we discuss in Section 3, Hull regarded MFN as beneficial, since it
oﬀered a way to “multilateralize” the reciprocal tariﬀ reductions that governments
might negotiate bilaterally. The formal validity of Hull’s assessment, however,
is not obvious. More generally, there is a basic impediment to formalizing the
benefits associated with MFN. As Caplin and Krishna (1988, pp. 281-82) note:
“There is a simple observation which illustrates the diﬃculties in providing a general
bargaining-theoretic rationale for MFN. There is a grand utility possibility frontier
available to countries using all the commercial trading instruments at their disposal,
such as tariﬀs. If we view the bargaining process as yielding eﬃcient outcomes, as for
example with the Nash bargaining solution, then MFN simply limits the tools available
to diﬀerent countries, shifting in the utility possibility frontier. Hence the most positive
aspects of MFN can only be illustrated when the bargaining process absent-MFN yields
ineﬃcient outcomes.”
This observation suggests that any potential benefits of MFN that can serve to
counter-balance its free-riding costs can only become apparent in an environment
where bargaining ineﬃciencies already exist in the absence of MFN.
What, then, is the source of the bargaining ineﬃciency which the principle
of MFN could correct? There are a number of possible sources which might be
considered.44 We identify in this section two institutional sources of bargaining
44The economics literature has recently considered several sources of ineﬃciency which MFN
may help to correct. We mention here three possibilities. First, McCalman (1997) explores
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ineﬃciency that arise under multi-country negotiations whenMFN is not imposed.
A first source emerges when trade negotiations occur through time and between
the governments of many countries, so that there is a possibility of “bilateral
opportunism” through discriminatory agreements. We describe how MFN can
by itself oﬀer only a partial solution to the bilateral opportunism problem, but
we show that MFN in combination with reciprocity eliminates this problem. A
second source of bargaining ineﬃciency arises when governments are permitted
to renegotiate their agreements under reciprocity and discriminatory tariﬀs are
allowed. In this case, it is the reciprocity rule itself that is the source of the
bargaining ineﬃciency in discriminatory environments, and we describe how this
ineﬃciency is eliminated with the addition of the MFN rule. With each of these
cases, we thus establish that MFN can eliminate a problem when reciprocity
is also present, and in this way we provide an institutional rationale for MFN
in the company of reciprocity. To develop this rationale, we first outline the
essential features of the multi-country general equilibrium model that underlies
our discussion. We then proceed as in the previous section, considering first trade
negotiations under reciprocity and second renegotiation under reciprocity.
5.2. The Multi-Country Model
The basic insights can be communicated with the development of a three-country
model, in which the home country imports good x from foreign countries ∗1 and
∗2 and exports good y to these same countries. To simplify the discussion, we
suppose further that the two foreign countries do not trade with one another.
The home government is thus the only government that has the opportunity to
set discriminatory tariﬀs across its partners. After describing the essential features
of this model, we define government preferences for the multi-country setting and
consider the externalities that arise between governments.
the possible eﬃciency-enhancing role of MFN in a bargaining setting where private information
prevents countries from reaching eﬃcient outcomes in the absence of MFN. Second, Choi (1995)
considers the role that MFNmay play as a commitment device that promotes greater investment,
in a strategic trade-policy game between an importing government and foreign exporting firms
who make investment decisions. And third, in a recent paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999b), we
examine the implications of MFN when governments have heteregeneous discount factors and
enforcement considerations prevent them from reaching the eﬃciency frontier. The economics
literature that addresses the broader implications of MFN is comprehensively surveyed by Horn
and Mavroidis (2000).
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5.2.1. The General Equilibrium Model
We begin with the direct extension of our two-country notation to the multi-
country setting. As before, the home local relative price is denoted as p = px/py,
and similarly we now represent the local relative price in foreign country i as
p∗i = p∗ix /p
∗i
y , for i = 1, 2. The ad valorem tariﬀ that the home government places
on imports of x from foreign country i is denoted as ti, and t∗i is likewise the
ad valorem tariﬀ levied by the government of foreign country i on imports of y
from the home country. The world price for trade between the home country
and foreign country i — the ratio of exporter prices for trade between them —
is defined as pwi ≡ p∗ix /py. Next, letting τ i ≡ (1 + ti) and τ∗i ≡ (1 + t∗i), we
represent local prices in terms of world prices and tariﬀs: p = τ ipwi ≡ p(τ i, pwi)
and p∗i = pwi/τ∗i ≡ p∗i(τ∗i, pwi). Thus, as in the two-country model, local prices
are determined, once tariﬀs and world prices are given.
Consider now the possibility that the home government selects discriminatory
tariﬀs, in which case the home tariﬀ on imports from foreign country 1 diﬀers
from that on imports from foreign country 2, or τ1 6= τ 2. Under discriminatory
tariﬀs, there exist two distinct world prices, but the world prices are linked by the
requirement of a single home local price:
p = τ1pw1 = τ2pw2 (5.1)
By contrast, the principle of MFN requires that the home country levy the same
tariﬀ on good x, whether the good emanates from foreign country 1 or 2, or
τ 1 = τ 2. Under MFN tariﬀs, therefore, a single world price arises: pw1 = pw2 ≡ pw.
Whether or not tariﬀs are discriminatory, the world price pwi represents foreign
country i’s terms of trade. Likewise, we may understand 1/pwi as the home coun-
try’s bilateral terms of trade with foreign partner i. The home country, however,
has multiple trading partners, and the representation of its overall multilateral
terms of trade is more involved.
As might be expected, the home country’s multilateral terms of trade can be
defined as a function of the trade-weighted average of the bilateral terms of trade.
To see this, we first define bilateral trade shares by
s∗ix (p






∗i, pwi) is the export supply function for foreign country i. With this,
we next define the domestic country’s multilateral terms of trade by the trade-
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weighted average of the bilateral world prices:
T (p∗1, p∗2, pw1, pw2) ≡X
i=1,2
s∗ix (p
∗1, p∗2, pw1, pw2) · pwi.45 (5.3)
Using (5.1) and (5.3), we may already spot an important relationship between
the principle of MFN and the multilateral terms of trade. In particular, if the
home government adopts an MFN-tariﬀ policy, then it follows that T = pwi ≡ pw.
The multilateral terms of trade under MFN is thus given by the single world price
that then prevails. On the other hand, under a discriminatory tariﬀ policy, there
are two world prices, and so T 6= pwi for all i. As we discuss further below, this
means that the multilateral terms-of-trade externality then fundamentally derives
from the bilateral terms of trade and the respective export shares.
We confirm in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 2000a) that the relationships and
definitions presented above can be used to determine all domestic and foreign
economic quantities for any set of local and world prices, and we verify that the
requirements of market-clearing and world-price linkage (i.e., equation (5.1)) suf-
fice for the determination of the equilibrium world prices, epw1(τ ) and epw2(τ ),
where τ ≡ (τ 1,τ 2, τ∗1, τ∗2). Summarizing, with their selections of tariﬀs, govern-
ments determine the equilibrium world prices, and the tariﬀs and world prices
together then imply equilibrium values for all local prices and quantities.
We assume that the prices so determined depend upon tariﬀs in the “stan-
dard” manner. As in the two-country model, we assume that if foreign country
i confronts a higher tariﬀ on its exports (i.e., if τ i increases) or if it lowers its
own tariﬀ (i.e., if τ∗i decreases), then it experiences a reduction in its terms of
trade (i.e., epwi decreases). We assume as well that foreign country i experience
a terms-of-trade gain (i.e., epwi increases) whenever the other two countries raise
tariﬀs on one another (i.e., whenever τ j increases or τ ∗j increases). Intuitively, if
the home government taxes more heavily the exports of foreign country j, then
the home demand for exports from foreign country i is increased, resulting in
a terms-of-trade gain for foreign country i. Likewise, if foreign country j were
to raise its import tariﬀ on exports from the home country, then those exports
would be diverted to foreign country i, who would enjoy a lower price on the home
export and thus a terms-of-trade gain. Finally, if the home government selects
among MFN tariﬀs, then an increase in the home tariﬀ amounts to a simultaneous
increase in the tariﬀ applied to the exports of both foreign countries. In this case,
45In fact, T is a measure of the reciprocal of domestic terms of trade: an improvement in the
domestic terms of trade corresponds to a lower value for T .
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we assume that the direct eﬀect of a higher tariﬀ applied to one’s own exports
dominates, so that each foreign country experiences a terms-of-trade loss.
5.2.2. Government Preferences
We next extend the representation of government preferences to the multi-country
setting. As before, we allow for a general representation. The objectives of the
home and foreign governments are respectively given asW (p, T ) andW ∗i(p∗i, epwi),
where all prices and terms of trade are evaluated at their market-clearing levels.
The key assumption is again that, with local prices held fixed, each government
strictly prefers an improvement in its terms of trade:
WT (p, T ) < 0 and W ∗ipwi(p
∗i, pwi) > 0. (5.4)
In other words, each government prefers an international redistribution in income
from other countries to its own country.46
The multi-country model admits an interesting pattern of externalities. Con-
sider first the government of foreign country i. This government is aﬀected by
the tariﬀs of the home country and foreign country j, but, as in the two-country
model, in each case the tariﬀ externality travels through the associated world
price, epwi. The home government’s situation is more novel. As a general matter,
the eﬀect of foreign tariﬀs on home-government welfare travels through the mul-
tilateral terms of trade, T . But, as we have seen, T may be further decomposed
into world-price and foreign-local-price (i.e., export share) influences, suggesting
a potentially more complicated underlying pattern of externalities.
In particular, if the home government adopts discriminatory tariﬀs, then the
externalities that are associated with foreign tariﬀ choices travel through world
prices and foreign local prices (and thereby through T ). Intuitively, imagine that
the government of the home country selects a tariﬀ that is higher on imports from
foreign country 1. Then the government of the home country is aﬀected by the
46This assumption ensures a welfare gain when the terms of trade are improved and the local
price is held fixed. In our discussion below, we rely on a slightly stronger assumption: the initial
tariﬀs from which negotiated adjustments are made are positioned so that government welfare
rises (falls) whenever a single tariﬀ is changed that induces for this government a terms-of-trade
gain (loss). This assumption simplifies the exposition, and it ensures that the welfare eﬀect
of a change in any particular tariﬀ is always consistent with the terms-of-trade implications
of this change. We thereby eliminate the possibility that a government would be so desirous
of a local-price change that it would gain even if this change came about from a single policy
adjustment (e.g., an increase in a trading partner’s tariﬀ) that resulted in a terms-of-trade loss.
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composition of the trade volume across its foreign trading partners: all else equal,
the government of the home country would prefer that more of a fixed total trade
volume come from foreign country 1, on whom it places the highest tariﬀ. But the
respective export shares from foreign countries 1 and 2 are determined (in part) by
the local prices in these countries, and so under discriminatory tariﬀs both world-
and foreign-local-price externalities arise. On the other hand, if the government of
the home country selects MFN tariﬀs, then T = pwi ≡ pw, and so the foreign-local-
price externality is removed. Intuitively, under MFN tariﬀs, the home government
no longer has a direct interest in the composition of trade volume, and so the
welfare of this government is no longer separately aﬀected by foreign local prices.
Therefore, the MFN principle ensures that the only externality that arises between
governments is the world-price externality.
At a broad level, a benefit of the MFN principle within the GATT system may
now be anticipated, when it is recalled that the principle of reciprocity works to
neutralize the world-price externality. The two principles together therefore may
be generally interpreted to embody eﬃciency-enhancing properties.47 In the next
two sections, we discuss two specific representations of this general interpretation.
5.3. MFN, Reciprocity and Trade Negotiations
Our discussion begins with the observation that GATT negotiations occur through
time and between the governments of various countries. Horn and Mavroidis
(2000, p. 34) describe the GATT/WTO bargaining process in this way:48
“In the WTO, negotiations for the most part take place between subsets of member
countries. Sometimes this is ‘oﬃcially sanctioned,’ as in the case of Principal Supplier
negotiations. But also in seemingly multilateral negotiations, the ‘actual’ negotiations
occur between a very limited number of countries.”
This negotiation process raises a natural concern: A government may worry that
the value of concessions that it wins today may be eroded in a future bilateral
negotiation to which it is not party. This worry, in turn, may feed back to aﬀect
current negotiations. For example, if governments suspect that current market
47This rationale for the principle of non-discrimination appears to be distinct from the “mul-
tilateralization” benefits that Hull associated with this principle. As Culbert (1987) discusses,
Hull also attached to the principle of non-discrimination wider benefits, including a reduction
in the risk of war.
48See also Hoekman and Kostecki (1995, pp. 56-83).
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access relations may be vulnerable to opportunistic bilateral agreements in the
future, then they may well exchange concessions today with trepidation. As a
general matter, then, the potential for “opportunistic” bilateral agreements sug-
gests a bargaining ineﬃciency, and raises the possibility that negotiation rules
such as MFN might provide a remedy.
Two questions are suggested. First, how significant is the potential for bilateral
opportunism, anyway? Second, if there is indeed significant potential, can the key
GATT rules in fact play an eﬃciency-enhancing role by protecting the welfare of
non-participating governments?
5.3.1. Significance
To get a feel for the potential significance of the problem, let us suppose that the
three governments have reached an eﬃcient trade agreement, and let us consider
whether the home government and the government of foreign country i can then
negotiate a bilateral trade agreement in which they each gain. Given that the
initial arrangement is eﬃcient, the two negotiating governments can gain only if
they reach a bilateral agreement that is opportunistic (i.e., that extracts welfare
from the non-participating foreign government j). With the assumption of an
initial eﬃcient agreement, we are thus able to gain easily a rough sense of the
general potential for bilateral opportunism.
As we show in Bagwell and Staiger (2000a), any point on the eﬃciency frontier
must take the form that is illustrated in Figure 6. This figure depicts the iso-
welfare curves of the three governments, where the axes represent the negotiated
tariﬀs τ i and τ∗i that the home government and the government of foreign country
i respectively apply to each other’s exports. Notice that the iso-welfare curve
for the (non-participating) government of foreign country j is downward sloping,
since this government gains when either of the two negotiating governments raises
the tariﬀ that it applies to the exports of the other.49 The iso-welfare curve for
each negotiating government, however, is upward sloping, indicating that each
negotiating government can maintain indiﬀerence only if the benefit of its own
tariﬀ increase is balanced against the cost of a tariﬀ increase from its partner.
The most important lesson from the figure concerns the location of the lens
within which the negotiating governments can both gain. The lens lies below
49In Figure 6, the iso-welfare curve for the government of foreign country j can also be
described as an iso-epwj curve. This is because, with its own tariﬀ held fixed, the government of
foreign country j is aﬀected by changes in τ i and τ∗i only in so far as these changes aﬀect its
terms of trade, epwj .
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the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j.50 The negotiating
governments thus enter this lens by reducing the tariﬀs that they apply to one
another, and the welfare gains that they enjoy reflect directly the welfare that they
extract from the non-participating government of foreign country j, whose country
then experiences a terms-of-trade loss. In fact, as every eﬃcient tariﬀ vector must
generate a lens such as that depicted in Figure 6, every eﬃcient tariﬀ vector
is vulnerable to bilateral opportunism through “concession erosion” in this sense.
While a complete analysis would fully describe the dynamic process through which
governments pick negotiation partners (form coalitions), the discussion presented
here strongly suggests an answer to our first question: the potential for bilateral
opportunism appears quite significant.
5.3.2. MFN and Reciprocity
We turn now to our second question and consider whether the key GATT rules
can play an eﬃciency-enhancing role. Such a role would arise if these rules served
to protect the welfare of non-participating governments, so that the value of con-
cessions previously received could not be later eroded through an opportunistic
bilateral agreement. It seems intuitive that MFN might play this role. Indeed,
after considering the various costs and benefits of the MFN rule, Schwartz and
Sykes (1997, p. 62) argue that the main benefit of MFN is that it prevents the
concession erosion that opportunistic bilateral agreements imply:
“More important, the MFN obligation protects the value of concessions against
future erosion through discrimination. If country A receives a concession from country
B and is not entitled to MFN treatment from B, then the value of the concession can
be undermined if country B later makes an even better concession to country C on
the same goods (or close substitutes). Faced with this uncertainty, country A would
oﬀer less for the concession in the first place (as would country B for the reciprocal
concession), and fewer valuable deals would be struck.”
50To understand the location of the lens, it is instructive to consider the opposite possibility,
in which the lens lies above the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign country j. The
negotiating governments could then gain by raising their tariﬀs, but this would generate a terms-
of-trade improvement for foreign country j, resulting in a welfare gain for all three governments,
in contradiction to the assumption that the initial tariﬀ configuration is eﬃcient. A more subtle
possibility is that there is no lens: the iso-welfare curves of the negotiating governments are
tangent at the point at which they intersect the iso-welfare curve of the government of foreign
country j. This arrangement also fails to be eﬃcient, but a more involved alteration of tariﬀs
is now required to produce gains to all three governments (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2000a).
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While it is clear that MFN provides some protection in this regard, we argue
next that MFN on its own does not fully eliminate the potential for opportunistic
bilateral agreements.
To establish this point, we imagine that the three governments have previously
negotiated to some initial tariﬀ configuration. The home tariﬀs satisfy the MFN
rule, but we do not assume that this tariﬀ configuration is necessarily eﬃcient
(even within the MFN class). We then consider whether the home government
and the government of foreign country i can subsequently liberalize tariﬀs through
a bilateral agreement, in a manner that reduces the welfare of the government of
foreign country j, even though this government receives the home-country tariﬀ
reduction on an MFN basis and does not alter its own tariﬀ. To see that this
is possible, observe that the government of foreign country j is aﬀected as a
non-participant by the bilateral agreement only through any consequent change
in its terms of trade. On the one hand, the government of foreign country j is
pleased to experience a reduction in the MFN tariﬀ of the home government,
since this benefits its exporters and correspondingly improves its terms of trade.
On the other hand, though, the government of foreign country j is distressed by
the reduction in the tariﬀ of foreign country i, since this diverts home-country
exports away from foreign country j, harming foreign country j’s consumers and
diminishing its terms of trade. Clearly, if the reduction in foreign country i’s tariﬀ
is large in comparison to the MFN tariﬀ reduction of the home country, then the
government of foreign country j experiences an overall terms-of-trade loss and
thus a reduction in welfare.51
As this discussion clarifies, the bilateral opportunism problem remains, so
long as the rules of negotiation allow that the governments of the home country
and foreign country i may enter into a bilateral agreement in which they alter
foreign country j’s terms of trade, epwj. Taking this general perspective, MFN
51It may be wondered if the government of foreign country i would be willing to participate
in such a bilateral agreement. Under the MFN rule, the two foreign countries share the same
terms of trade, and so a bilateral agreement can extract welfare from foreign country j only
if it also reduces the terms of trade for foreign country i. In Bagwell and Staiger (2000a), we
examine this issue, showing that the negotiating partners can find a bilateral agreement that
reduces tariﬀs under which they both gain at the expense of the non-participating government,
while still respecting the MFN rule, if the government of foreign country i would prefer a greater
trade volume at the initial world price. In this case, the bilateral agreement results in a change
in tariﬀs that compensates the government of foreign country i for its terms-of-trade loss with
a less trade-restrictive local price. (Note that this finding is consistent with the assumption
presented in footnote 46, since the bilateral agreement results in a change in two tariﬀs.)
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fails to protect non-participant welfare for a simple reason: While MFN ensures
a single world price, epw ≡ epwi = epwj, it does not fix that world price. In a similar
manner, it can be demonstrated that reciprocity alone also fails to protect non-
participant welfare. If the rules of negotiation restrain the home government and
the government of foreign country i to consider only bilateral agreements that
satisfy the principle of reciprocity, then, as in the two-country model of Section
4, we may derive that such an agreement preserves the terms of trade between
the negotiating partners, epwi. This, however, is not the same thing as fixing the
non-participant’s terms of trade, epwj.
Suppose, though, that MFN and reciprocity are both required. In this case,
MFN ensures a single world price, while reciprocity guarantees that this world
price is fixed. Together, MFN and reciprocity therefore ensure that the non-
participant’s terms of trade cannot be altered. It follows that the welfare of
the non-participant government is not aﬀected - for better or worse - by any
bilateral agreement that strictly respects the principles of MFN and reciprocity.
Under these rules, then, governments can negotiate without fear of future bilateral
opportunism and the consequent erosion in concession value.52 In fact, by the
same logic, the traditional “free-riding” cost of MFN disappears when this rule
is tightly joined with reciprocity. This is because the non-participant also gains
nothing from a bilateral agreement that respects both MFN and reciprocity.53
5.4. MFN, Reciprocity and Renegotiation
In Section 4, using a two-country model, we argue that the potential to renego-
tiate subject to reciprocity directs the negotiation outcome toward the particular
point on the eﬃciency frontier at which governments select their politically opti-
mal tariﬀs. We now reconsider the implications of renegotiation under reciprocity
in the context of our multi-country model. We argue that a bargaining ineﬃ-
ciency is assured when GATT’s reciprocity rule is followed and discriminatory
52As noted in Section 4.3, while reciprocity is often sought by GATT members in their nego-
tiations, it is not in fact required by GATT. In Bagwell and Staiger (2000a) we account for this
feature. There we develop the interpretation of GATT’s principle of reciprocity as providing a
“first line of defense” against the problem of bilateral opportunism when this principle is joined
with MFN, and we show that GATT’s non-violation nullification-or-impairment clause can then
provide an important second line of defense against the bilateral opportunism problem.
53Bagwell and Staiger (2000c) consider a two-period model in which trading relationships
change through time and governments engage in MFN tariﬀ negotiations in each period, and
show how the free-rider problem in the presence of MFN can be solved when MFN is joined
with the principle of reciprocity.
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tariﬀs are used. But we argue that this ineﬃciency can be prevented if the home
government’s tariﬀs are non-discriminatory. In this way, GATT’s pillars of reci-
procity and MFN again may be seen as complementary principles that permit
governments to achieve eﬃcient outcomes in a multi-country setting.
We begin by considering the properties of politically optimal tariﬀs in the
presence of multiple countries. For the multi-country model, a configuration of
tariﬀs {τ 1, τ2, τ ∗1, τ ∗2} is politically optimal ifWp =W ∗ip∗i = 0 for i = 1, 2. In other
words, the tariﬀ configuration is politically optimal if each government achieves
its preferred local price, when its terms of trade are fixed. If the home government
is allowed to choose discriminatory tariﬀs (τ1 6= τ 2), then the property of political
optimality amounts to three requirements (one for each country) that are placed on
four tariﬀs. In the multi-country model, there are thus many politically optimal
tariﬀs. But if the tariﬀs of the home government must satisfy the MFN rule
(τ 1 = τ 2), then there are only three tariﬀs to consider, and the model thus admits
a unique configuration of politically optimal MFN tariﬀs.
We now recall that there are two fundamental channels through which foreign
government i’s tariﬀ policy (τ ∗i) may alter the home country’s multilateral terms
of trade (T ) and thereby impose an externality upon the welfare of the home gov-
ernment. First, the foreign tariﬀ selection aﬀects the home government through
the induced change in the bilateral terms of trade (epwi). Second, when the home
government uses a discriminatory tariﬀ policy, it cares as well about the composi-
tion of its trade volume across its foreign trading partners. Under discriminatory
home tariﬀs, therefore, the tariﬀ policy selected by the government of foreign
country i can also aﬀect home-government welfare by altering the foreign local
price (p∗i) and thus changing the export share that emanates from this country.
Using the arguments developed in Section 2, it may be verified that politically
optimal MFN tariﬀs are eﬃcient in the multi-country setting. The underlying
idea is now familiar. Under MFN, the only externality between governments
arises through the (single) world price, and governments are not motivated by
world-price movements when they select politically optimal tariﬀs. A more sur-
prising finding concerns the necessity of MFN tariﬀs: politically optimal tariﬀs
are eﬃcient only if they also conform to MFN. The bottom line, then, is that
the politically optimal MFN tariﬀs are eﬃcient and all other politically optimal
tariﬀs are not.
Why are politically optimal tariﬀs eﬃcient only if they satisfy MFN? We
present a formal proof in Bagwell and Staiger (1999a), but the basic argument is
easily related. Suppose that the governments adopt politically optimal tariﬀs and
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that the home tariﬀs violate MFN, with the home government placing a higher
tariﬀ on exports from foreign country 1. The home government could then suggest
that, if the government of foreign country 1 would slightly lower its tariﬀ, then the
home government would in return adjust both of its tariﬀs downward slightly, in a
manner that would leave both world prices unchanged. The government of foreign
country 2 would be indiﬀerent to these adjustments, since it does not change its
own tariﬀ and the combination of tariﬀ adjustments maintains its original terms
of trade. The government of foreign government 1 also experiences no change in
its terms of trade; however, since this government adjusts its own tariﬀ downward,
it experiences a change in its local price. This local-price change does not result in
a (first-order) welfare loss for the government of foreign-country 1, though, since
under political optimality this government begins with its preferred local price
(W ∗1p∗1 = 0). The suggested tariﬀ adjustment thus leaves unaltered the welfares of
both foreign governments.
The remaining step is to establish that the suggested tariﬀ adjustment gener-
ates a strict welfare gain for the home government. Such a gain cannot derive from
a consequent change in the home local price, since under political optimality the
home government begins with its preferred local price (Wp = 0). A strict welfare
gain for the home government therefore occurs if and only if the suggested tariﬀ
adjustment improves the home country’s multilateral terms of trade. How could
this happen? By construction, neither world price changes. Remember, though,
that the tariﬀ adjustments cause a local-price change in foreign country 1 that
induces this country to trade a greater volume. The home government’s multi-
lateral terms of trade (T ) are thus improved, since a greater share of trade now
emanates from the partner on whom it places a higher tariﬀ. As a consequence,
when the home country uses discriminatory tariﬀs, politically optimal tariﬀs can
be improved upon and are thus ineﬃcient.
Intuitively, it can now be argued that an eﬃcient trade agreement in which the
home government uses discriminatory tariﬀs cannot be implemented when gov-
ernments are allowed to renegotiate under reciprocity.54 Building on the intuition
developed in the two-country model of Section 4.3, it may be shown that when
governments can renegotiate under reciprocity, at least one government obtains
its preferred local price. If we require as well that the eventual outcome is eﬃ-
cient, then the fact that one government achieves its preferred local price implies
54The argument that we present here is intuitive in nature, as the formal analysis is somewhat
involved. The interested reader is referred to Bagwell and Staiger (1999a), where we consider a
Multilateral Negotiation Game and formalize this point (as well as those that follow).
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that the other governments must as well.55 Therefore, if an eﬃcient outcome is
to emerge when governments have the ability to renegotiate under reciprocity,
then the outcome must be politically optimal. But, as the discussion just above
establishes, a politically optimal outcome is not eﬃcient when home tariﬀs are dis-
criminatory. When governments can renegotiate under reciprocity, a bargaining
ineﬃciency is therefore implied, unless the home government selects MFN tariﬀs.
At the same time, there does exists an eﬃcient trade agreement in which the
home government uses MFN tariﬀs that can be implemented when governments
are allowed to renegotiate under reciprocity. Intuitively, when home tariﬀs con-
form to MFN, the multi-country model behaves like the two-country model, with
all externalities channeled through the world price. Recalling the two-country
discussion of reciprocity and renegotiation of Section 4.3, it is thus not surprising
that an eﬃcient and non—discriminatory trade outcome - namely, the politically
optimal MFN tariﬀs - can be implemented under reciprocity.
6. Enforcement
In the previous two sections, we focus on a literature that assumes that a trade
agreement once negotiated can be enforced. While this focus serves to highlight
the eﬃciency properties that may be associated with the principles of reciprocity
and non-discrimination, the manner in which a trade agreement is enforced is
also of fundamental importance. As we discuss in Section 3.2.3, an international
agreement must be self-enforcing if it is to be credible, and an agreement to open
markets is in turn self-enforcing only if it also specifies credible retaliatory mea-
sures against any country that deviates from the agreement and places additional
restrictions on trade. In the present section, we return to the topic of enforce-
ment and develop more fully some of the themes from this literature. We begin
with a careful consideration of the various roles for retaliation within GATT. We
next draw relationships between these roles and the theory of repeated games,
on which we rely in oﬀering a formal representation of the requirement of a self-
enforcing trade agreement. We then discuss a pair of predictions that emerge,
once enforcement considerations are featured. Finally, we discuss the possibility
that a multilateral institution such as GATT can better enable governments to
55For the two-country confirmation of this point, see footnote 39. We show in Bagwell and
Staiger (2000a) that this point requires some slight modification when the home government’s
tariﬀs are restricted to satisfy the MFN rule and when eﬃciency is evaluated with respect to
this restrictive class of instruments.
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enforce trade agreements.
6.1. GATT Enforcement and the Theory of Repeated Games
The basic enforcement problem may be understood with reference to Figure 3.
As this figure illustrates, each government could gain if both agreed to adhere to
a rule that binds tariﬀs at a tariﬀ pair on the contract curve corresponding, say,
to the political optimum. It is also true, however, that each government has an
immediate incentive to cheat on such an agreement, by deviating to a tariﬀ on
its tariﬀ reaction curve (not pictured) and exploiting its ability to shift the costs
of intervention onto its trading partner. This raises a central issue that confronts
governments as they design a trade agreement: By what mechanism is the tariﬀ
binding to be enforced?
Since countries trade repeatedly over time, the natural possibility is that a
trade agreement is made self-enforcing through the prospect of retaliation. Ac-
cording to this logic, each government balances its short-term incentive to cheat
against the long-term cost that such behavior implies, once the other governments
retaliate by raising their own tariﬀs. Governments can thus push tariﬀs down and
achieve a more eﬃcient arrangement, until the incentive to cheat becomes so large
that it matches the long-term welfare loss that would be associated with the retal-
iatory consequences. An interesting implication of this repeated-game perspective
is that the tariﬀs specified by a trade agreement ultimately may be determined
by the enforcement incentive constraints.
As we discuss in Sections 2.3 and 3, the GATT dispute settlement procedures
may be generally understood from this perspective. In broad terms, the creation
of GATT and its Article XXII and XXIII nullification-or-impairment procedures
may be interpreted as an attempt to move from a non-cooperative to a coopera-
tive equilibrium outcome, by limiting the use of retaliation along the equilibrium
path and repositioning retaliation as an oﬀ-equilibrium-path threat that enforces
cooperative equilibrium-path rules. This perspective is consistent, for example,
with the following statement of one of the drafters of Article XXIII (as found in
Petersmann, 1997, p. 83):
“We have asked the nations of the world to confer upon an international organization
the right to limit their power to retaliate. We have sought to tame retaliation, to
discipline it, to keep it within bounds. By subjecting it to the restraints of international
control, we have endeavored to check its spread and growth, to convert it from a weapon
of economic warfare to an instrument of international order.”56
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At the same time, it should be stressed that a limited role for retaliation
indeed does arise along the equilibrium path, and this role for on-equilibrium-path
retaliation is spread across a number of GATT articles.57 For instance, retaliation
along the equilibrium path arises when a government seeks a retaliatory exception
to obtain compensation for an original tariﬀ adjustment by its trading partner,
where the original adjustment is justified as a GATT-permissible exception, as
allowed under Article XIX (safeguards) or Article XXVIII (renegotiation). A role
for retaliation along the equilibrium path can arise as well when a government
uses the non-violation provisions of Article XXIII to seek redress for nullification
or impairment that was caused by an original action taken by its trading partner
that was not itself proscribed by GATT rules. As we discuss further below, it
even may be argued that a role for retaliation arises along the equilibrium path, if
a trading partner takes an action that nullifies or impairs a government’s market
access rights, and this action is subsequently determined in an Article XXIII ruling
to be in violation of GATT rules. This all suggests that the role of retaliation
as it is found within the various GATT articles is more subtle than a standard
application of repeated-game theory might suggest.
The distinct roles for retaliation within GATT are recognized by legal scholars.
For example, Jackson (1969, pp. 169-71) points to a potential conflict between the
various goals for retaliation that are found even within Article XXIII itself. On
one the hand, the drafters sought to use the prospect of retaliation within Article
XXIII to “play an important role in obtaining compliance with the GATT obliga-
tions.” This goal resonates with the oﬀ-equilibrium-path role for retaliation in the
standard repeated-game formulation, as here the role of retaliation is to generate
a balance between the short-term incentive to cheat on the agreement and the
long-term costs of retaliation. On the other hand, the drafters sought as well to
use retaliation in Article XXIII “as a means for ensuring continued reciprocity
and balance of concessions in the face of possibly changing circumstances.” The
56Similarly, a drafter of Article XXIII remarks (as quoted in Jackson, 1969, pp. 170-71):
“What we have really provided, in the last analysis, is not that retaliation shall be invited or
sanctions invoked, but that a balance of interests once established, shall be maintained.” Further
support for this perspective is oﬀered by Dam (1970, pp. 80-81), as quoted in Section 3.2.3.
57Jackson (1969, p. 165), lists seven diﬀerent GATT articles within which provisions for the
compensatory withdrawal or suspension of concessions may be found. As Petersmann (1997,
pp. 177-178) explains, the integrated dispute settlement system of the WTO attempts to unify
to some extent the settlement of disputes, and thereby provides less scope for “rule shopping”
than did the “legally fragmented” GATT procedures, but many of the agreements within the
WTO still contain their own special dispute settlement rules and procedures.
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role of retaliation here may be best interpreted as an on-equilibrium-path means
of obtaining compensation, so that “unilateral” actions can be converted to “re-
ciprocal” actions, as in this way it is possible to allow for policy adjustments to
changing circumstances without upsetting the balance of concessions.
The distinction between the on- and oﬀ-equilibrium-path roles of retaliation
within GATT may be further clarified with the consideration of three situations.
Suppose first that a foreign government raises its tariﬀ above its bound rate and
justifies its behavior as a GATT-permissible exception. The home government
may then seek compensation. If, however, the parties are unable to reach an
agreement on the appropriate compensation, then the home government may
take its own retaliatory exception, with a tariﬀ hike that is of a “substantially
equivalent” nature.58 Retaliation here is best interpreted as an on-equilibrium-
path event, whose purpose is to discipline the use of GATT-permissible exceptions,
so that their application reflects a legitimate purpose and not a desire to shift the
costs of intervention onto a trading partner.
As a second possibility, suppose that the foreign government raises its tariﬀ,
but argues that the circumstances are such that its tariﬀ hike does not warrant
compensation or retaliation. The home government disputes this interpretation
of GATT rules, and takes the case to a GATT panel. Suppose further that the
panel rules in favor of the home government and authorizes the home government
to impose retaliatory tariﬀs.59 This second possibility is diﬀerent from the first,
only in that a panel decision is required to resolve the legality of the protectionist
measure. Given the wide range of issues that may be raised between trading
partners, it is to be expected that honest disputes of interpretation will arise from
time to time. Arguably, in such a case, the authorized retaliation which follows
a panel’s resolution of a dispute may again be viewed as an on-equilibrium-path
retaliation, whose purpose is eﬀectively to ensure that the unilateral action of
the foreign government is converted to a reciprocal action by it and its domestic
trading partner, so that the foreign government does not shift the costs of its
58See, however, Section 6.2.1 for a discussion of the extent to which retaliation under Article
XIX is allowed following the formation of the WTO.
59As an example of such a possibility, the E.U. has argued that it is entitled under GATT
Article XX to prohibit the importation of hormone-treated beef, due to the possible associated
health risks and its intepretation of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, which
provides for governments to impose product standards on imports when scientific evidence in-
dicates a health risk. The U.S., by contrast, has argued that scientific studies do not support
the E.U. view and that the ensuing protection requires compensation or retaliation. The WTO
panel ruled in favor of the U.S. position and authorized the U.S. to pursue retaliatory tariﬀs.
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intervention onto home-country exporters.60
Finally, consider a third possibility. Suppose that the home government com-
plains that a change in the foreign trade-policy has nullified or impaired the access
to the foreign market that it initially expected. The two governments again dis-
agree as to the legality of the foreign-government action, and the case is brought
before a dispute panel. Now allow for either of two scenarios. First, the panel
finds in favor of the foreign government, and yet the home government proceeds
anyway to set (unauthorized) retaliatory tariﬀs. Second, the panel finds in favor
of the home government, but after the home government sets its (authorized)
retaliatory tariﬀs the foreign government counter-retaliates with its own (unau-
thorized) tariﬀ increases. These two scenarios describe episodes of unauthorized
retaliatory tariﬀs that are set in contradiction to the then-known ruling of the
dispute panel. The line is not perfectly clear, but it seems reasonable to interpret
such defiant behavior as an oﬀ-equilibrium-path deviation. The fundamental de-
terrent to such behavior, and the deterrent that therefore rests at the foundation
of all others, is the fear of initiating a breakdown in the entire cooperative arrange-
ment and thereby causing a “trade war.” Simply, if a government plows over the
final backstop (the panel ruling) in the GATT dispute settlement process, other
governments may naturally question the relevance of this process. This view is in
line with Dunkel’s perception of a “balance of terror,” discussed in Section 3.2.3.
With this institutional description as a backdrop, we turn now to a formal
representation of a repeated game of tariﬀ formation. We begin with a standard
infinitely-repeated tariﬀ game between two governments. The two governments
interact in each of an infinite number of periods, where the environment is sta-
tionary over time and the static tariﬀ game of the (politically-augmented) terms-
of-trade theory serves as the associated stage game. Thus, in each period, the two
governments observe all previous import tariﬀ selections and simultaneously make
60The distincition between on- and oﬀ-equilibrium-path retaliation is not as clear in this second
possibility, because technically the foreign government stands in violation of the agreement if
it does not bring its policy into conformity with GATT rules once the panel ruling (subject to
possible appeal) is issued. But as Petersmann (1997, p. 77) observes, “...the illegality of a trade
measure may be removed not only by the withdrawal of the measure concerned but also by
its justification through invocation of one of GATT’s safeguard clauses...”. Such an invocation
would have the eﬀect of converting the (illegal) unilateral act of the foreign government into a
(legal) reciprocal act between it and the domestic government. Hence, we interpret this second
possibility as an on-equilibrium-path retaliation, since as a result of the “rebalancing” brought
about by this retalitation the market access outcome associated with the foreign government’s
illegal action is converted eﬀectively to what it would be under a legal action.
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their respective current import tariﬀ selections. In order to feature the key issues
that are associated with the enforcement of trade agreements, we assume further
that the two countries are symmetric. We consider stationary and symmetric
subgame perfect equilibria, in which the two governments select the same tariﬀ in
each period. If a deviation from this common tariﬀ occurs, then we assume that a
retaliatory trade war erupts, in the spirit of the third example above, whereby in
the next and all future periods governments revert to the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs
of the static game, given by τN .61 The discount factor is denoted as δ ∈ (0, 1).
In this repeated tariﬀ game, governments may enforce a cooperative tariﬀ τC,
with τC < τN , since the short-term benefit that any government enjoys from
raising the current-period tariﬀ above the agreed-upon level is balanced against
the long-term loss that this (and the other) government experiences as future
cooperation is lost and a retaliatory war is initiated. Intuitively, an agreement to
bind tariﬀs at τC can be enforced if the short-term incentive to cheat is suﬃciently
small relative to the discounted future value of avoiding the trade war that would
be triggered as a consequence. We assume, however, that governments are unable
to enforce the politically optimal tariﬀ, τPO. This assumption ensures that the
level of cooperation that governments may achieve is indeed determined by the
enforcement constraint. This will be the case if each government anticipates a
significant short-term gain in defecting from τPO and discounts suﬃciently the
cost of future retaliation.
We now formally characterize the short-term incentive that a government has
to cheat. Given the assumed symmetry across countries, there is no loss of gen-
erality in considering only the incentives of the domestic government. For a fixed
cooperative tariﬀ τC < τN , and given the class of subgame perfect equilibria upon
which we focus, if the domestic government deviates and selects τ 6= τC, then it
will deviate to its best-response tariﬀ, τR(τC) as defined implicitly by (2.7). The















Wpw(p(τ , epw), epw)∂ epw
∂τ
dτ
61The formal points that we wish to emphasize here are not particularly sensitive to the exact
specification of the retaliatory process. Thus, we may also view the Nash reversion threat as a
simple means of representing the qualitative idea that a deviation today results in diminished
cooperation and a corresponding loss in welfare tomorrow.
66
where epw ≡ epw(τ , τC) in the integrands.
We separate the short-term benefit from cheating into two components, the
first of which represents the welfare impact of the deviation through the change
in the local price and the second of which represents the welfare impact of the de-
viation through the change in the terms of trade. The first component is negative
(sinceWp < 0 over the entire range of integration), and it reflects the unfavorable
trade-oﬀ between the benefits and costs of achieving the local price implied by
the best-response tariﬀ when the welfare impact of the associated terms-of-trade
improvement is not included. The second component is positive, as it reflects
the welfare gain to the government from the transfer of income to itself from its
trading partner that occurs through the change in the terms of trade (i.e., from
shifting costs onto its trading partner). The sum of these two terms is positive
for τC < τR(τC) and is zero at τC = τR(τC), by the definition of the domes-
tic tariﬀ reaction function in (2.7). It follows that Ω(τC) is strictly positive for
τC < τN , and the domestic government is faced with the temptation to cheat on
the agreement by succumbing to cost-shifting motives.
When the domestic government cheats, however, it triggers a retaliatory phase,
and the long-term cost of this retaliation must also be considered. We characterize
first the one-period value to the domestic government of avoiding a trade war and
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where epw ≡ epw(τ , τ) in the integrands.62 With the world-price eﬀects of a trade
war neutralized under the assumed symmetry, the short-term value in avoiding a
trade war and sustaining the cooperative tariﬀ reflects the gains from the more-
eﬃcient local prices that are associated with the greater trade volume that coop-
eration implies. Under our assumption that τC > τPO we have that Wp < 0 for
τ ∈ [τC , τN ]; therefore, it follows that ω(τC) > 0 for τC < τN , while ω(τC) = 0
for τC = τN .
We are prepared now to define the total discounted value to cooperation that
the domestic government forfeits when it cheats. This value is given as V (τC) ≡
[δ/(1− δ)]ω(τC), since once a government deviates and selects a higher tariﬀ, the
cooperative tariﬀs are thereafter replaced by the higher Nash tariﬀs. With this,
it follows that the domestic government’s incentive constraint can be written as
62In deriving this expression, we use the fact that under symmetry depw(τ , τ)/dτ = 0 and
dp(τ , epw(τ , τ))/dτ = epw.
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Ω(τC) ≤ V (τC). (6.1)
Any cooperative tariﬀ τC that satisfies this incentive constraint can be enforced
as a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated tariﬀ game.
Consider now the “most-cooperative” tariﬀ, τ¯C, defined as the smallest tariﬀ
that satisfies the incentive constraint given in (6.1). Under our assumption that
the politically optimal tariﬀ cannot be enforced (i.e., that τPO violates (6.1)), we
have τ¯C > τPO. The determination of the most-cooperative tariﬀ is illustrated in
Figure 7. Observe there that Ω(τC) is monotonically decreasing in τC for τC < τN ,
while Ω(τC) is flat and equal to zero at τC = τN . Intuitively, a government gains
less in deviating from a cooperative tariﬀ τC the closer is that tariﬀ to the Nash
tariﬀ τN , and the government gains nothing from cheating when the “cooperative”
tariﬀ is already at the Nash level. Observe also that V (τC) is zero at τC = τN ,
monotonically decreasing in τC for τC < τPO, and flat at τC = τPO. These
properties arise because the gains from avoiding a trade war decline to zero as the
tariﬀs stipulated in the agreement rise from τPO and approach the Nash level that
would be selected in a trade war anyway; furthermore, at τPO, a small symmetric
increase in cooperative tariﬀs has no impact on government welfare (by the first-
order condition that defines τPO). The range of tariﬀs that can be enforced is
thus represented by the interval [τ¯C , τN ], and the most-cooperative tariﬀ τ¯C is
the tariﬀ at which the incentive constraint in (6.1) binds.63
This completes our description of the standard infinitely-repeated tariﬀ game.
Retaliation plays an important role in this game, as it represents the oﬀ-equilibrium-
path and long-term cost that would be experienced were a government to cheat
in the present. This game, however, is stationary, and so it fails to oﬀer a role for
GATT-permissible exceptions and the associated on-equilibrium-path retaliation
that we discuss in the first and second examples above. As well, this stationary
framework fails to account for the gradual manner in which trade liberalization
has proceeded under GATT. We turn to these possibilities in the next subsection.
63In the formal model of Section 2.1.3, the functions Ω and V possess the properties ascribed
to them at and around τN and τPO. The functions may or may not be convex and concave,
respectively, as depicted in Figure 7, and so it is possible that the functions intersect more than
once. We assume here that the curvature properties are met, and simply note that the analysis
can be generalized to handle the possibility of multiple intersections.
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6.2. Predictions
When viewed from the perspective of Figure 7, the task of enforcing a trade agree-
ment amounts to first achieving and then maintaining a balance between (i). the
short-term temptation to deviate unilaterally from an agreed-upon trade policy
and enjoy the terms-of-trade benefits, and (ii). the long-term costs of a consequent
future loss of cooperation. This balance is reflected in the determination of the
most-cooperative tariﬀ in Figure 7. If the world were stationary as we represent
it here, then the role of a dispute settlement mechanism simply might be to allow
governments to coordinate on this most-cooperative tariﬀ once and for all, and
then monitor the agreement for violations.
The world, however, is not stationary, and a self-enforcing agreement must
be responsive to this fact. In view of the balance between short- and long-term
incentives that a self-enforcing trade agreement requires, it is evident that any
event that alters the current incentive to cheat or the expected future value of
cooperation can upset this balance. The enforceable level of cooperation may thus
change with underlying market conditions. This suggests that countries cannot
be held rigidly to tariﬀ commitments in a self-enforcing agreement: if properly
designed, GATT must provide its members with ample flexibility to adjust tariﬀ
levels up or down as underlying circumstances change. We describe next two
predictions that emerge from this suggestion.
6.2.1. Rebalancing the Agreement: The GATT Escape Clause
In GATT Article XIX, a government is allowed to temporarily suspend a conces-
sion agreed upon in a previous negotiation, if its import-competing industry is
injured as a consequence of a temporary surge in import volume. In line with our
earlier work (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990), we argue here that this “escape clause”
can be interpreted as providing the flexibility that promotes greater cooperation as
part of a self-enforcing trade agreement for an economic environment that is char-
acterized by trade-volume volatility. To make this point, we assume for simplicity
that the politically optimal tariﬀ is invariant in the presence of trade-volume fluc-
tuations. This is the case, for example, if governments maximize national welfare,
as in this event the politically optimal tariﬀ corresponds to free trade.
The basic idea can be understood with reference to Figure 7. If the import
volumes experiences a temporary surge, then the function Ω shifts up, reflect-
ing the greater terms-of-trade gains that are possible in light of the larger trade
volume. On the other hand, given that the import swing is temporary, the func-
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tion V tends to remain stable, as the future value of cooperation is unaﬀected by
temporary fluctuations.64 As Figure 7 suggests, if governments were to prohibit
an adjustment in the cooperative tariﬀ, then the incentive constraint would be
“out of balance,” as the short-term incentive to cheat would be larger than the
long-term cost of a breakdown in cooperation. If, however, governments were to
include in the trade agreement an “escape clause” under which the import tariﬀ
could be temporarily increased in the event of an import-volume surge, then the
higher tariﬀ would diminish the incentive to cheat, thereby restoring intertempo-
ral balance. Arguing in this fashion, GATT’s Article XIX may be interpreted as
an escape clause or “safeguard” that prevents a breakdown in cooperation that
would otherwise occur were imports to surge.65
Taking this perspective, when a country experiences a surge in its import
volume, it restores the intertemporal balance between its short- and long-term in-
centives by adopting a higher tariﬀ. This exception, however, raises the prospect
that a government may be motivated in part by a desire to shift the costs of its
intervention onto its trading partner, thus upsetting a diﬀerent balance: the bal-
ance of concessions. In its original formulation, GATT’s Article XIX addresses
this possibility by allowing that the trading partner can then take a retaliatory
exception (on the equilibrium path) and withdraw its own substantially equiva-
lent concession. In this way, governments simultaneously maintain balance with
respect to their intertemporal enforcement incentives and their concessions. Put
diﬀerently, this approach enables governments to maintain the incentives for co-
operation in the face of changing circumstances, without providing a means for
one government to shift the costs of its intervention onto the other.66
Despite the theoretical virtue of this approach, however, the practical experi-
ence with GATT’s Article XIX has been somewhat mixed. As Ostry (1997, pp.
77, 99-100, 178-79) and Grimwade (1996, 89-92) explain, while GATT members
64This is the case if trade-volume shocks are i.i.d. across periods. More generally, shocks
of a “temporary” nature exert a greater influence on short-term (i.e., Ω) than long-term (i.e.,
V ) incentives. See Bagwell and Staiger (1995) for an analysis that predicts countercyclical
protection in the presence of “persistent” shocks to the trade-volume growth rate, such as might
occur in the context of the business cycle.
65Further support for this interpretation is oﬀered, for example, by Dixit (1996), Hoekman
and Kostecki (1995, p. 167) and Ostry (1997, p. 68). Hoeckman and Kostecki (1995, p. 168)
further observe that Article XIX safeguard actions were used 150 times from the inception of
GATT through 1994.
66A similar interpretation may be oﬀered for episodes of (on-the-equilibrium-path) retaliation
under Article XXIII.
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used Article XIX to legitimize temporary protection with great frequency in the
1970’s, they turned more toward instruments of managed trade (e.g., VER’s) in
the 1980’s. The apparent reason was that managed-trade policies often fell outside
of GATT rules and were in any case somewhat “non-transparent;” by contrast,
when a government raised a tariﬀ under GATT Article XIX, the aﬀected coun-
tries required notification and consultation and were permitted to seek retaliatory
exceptions as compensation for the original action.
This trend toward managed trade motivated the member governments to adopt
a number of changes as part of the formation of the WTO. Governments agreed to
phase out managed-trade policies, make trade-policy actions more “transparent,”
and amend Article XIX so that retaliatory responses by aﬀected partners were
prohibited for a three-year period following the original action. These changes are
designed to encourage governments to use Article XIX as opposed to managed-
trade policies when temporary import surges result in injury. At the same time,
these changes limit the scope for retaliation and thus diminish the discipline that
is applied to the safeguard exception, raising the possibility that governments may
now be tempted to shift costs onto one another through this exception.
6.2.2. Gradualism: Rounds of Trade Liberalization
While the extent of liberalization achieved under GATT is certainly remarkable for
the depth in the reduction of trade barriers, the process by which this liberalization
has occurred through 8 rounds of negotiation spread over a 5-decade period is no
less remarkable for its gradualism. This feature is not well-explained in the context
of a stationary model of enforcement; for example, in the context of Figure 7, there
is no reason that the liberalization from the high Nash tariﬀ to the lower most-
cooperative tariﬀ couldn’t be achieved in one great leap. What, then, accounts for
the gradual manner in which tariﬀs have been reduced through GATT rounds?
We sketch here an argument that derives from the work of Devereux (1997).
He emphasizes that production technologies may exhibit “learning by doing”: as
a firm produces more in the current period, it learns better how to produce its
output, and its production costs in all future periods fall. Consider now the im-
plications of learning-by-doing for the enforcement of trade agreements. Suppose
that the two governments initially select some high tariﬀ but then, through a
GATT round, negotiate a lower cooperative tariﬀ that reflects the current bal-
ance between the short-term benefits from protection and the long-term value of
a cooperative relationship. The initial liberalization eﬀort induces exporting firms
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to produce greater output, and, as time passes, these firms experience the lower
production costs that learning by doing implies. As a consequence, the gains from
trade for the two countries tend to grow as well, which is to say that the value
of cooperation as represented by the function V in Figure 7 tends to shift up as
time passes. When governments enter the next GATT round, therefore, they may
find that they can enforce a lower most-cooperative tariﬀ than was possible in the
previous round.67
This reasoning suggests that the gradual manner in which tariﬀs have been
reduced through GATT rounds reflects a “virtuous cycle” that plays out through
the incentive constraints associated with enforcement: an initial round of liber-
alization gives rise to changes in the economy (e.g., learning by doing), which in
turn enhances the value of cooperation, thereby permitting a further round of
liberalization, and so on.68
6.3. The Exchange and Aggregation of Enforcement Power
Our discussion to this point describes in some detail the role of retaliation in
GATT and a pair of predictions that emerge once enforcement constraints are con-
sidered. This suggests that GATT is an instrument through which governments
coordinate and achieve a self-enforcing cooperative trade-policy relationship. In
the real world, such large-scale coordination is not a trivial accomplishment.69
67As the countries specialize further, the volume of trade grows, and the function Ω may also
shift up, reflecting a heightened incentive to cheat. As Devereux (1997) finds, this means that
the Nash tariﬀs are higher when more learning has occurred. The flip-side of this is that the
gains to cooperation also rise with time, and Deveraux shows that the corresponding increase
in the function V dominates, in that most-cooperative tariﬀs decline through time.
68A related theory is presented by Staiger (1995b), who develops a model in which workers
have skills that are specific to the import-competing industry but gradually depreciate when not
in use. The relocation of these workers in response to trade liberalization plays a role analogous
to learning by doing in Deveraux’s (1997) model. See also Chisik (1999) and Furusawa and Lai
(1999). This approach is related to that of Bhagwati (1990), Gilligan (1997) and Krishna and
Mitra (1999), in their analyses of reciprocity (as described above in Section 4.2). In all of these
cases, gradualism reflects a changing government preference function, where the change may
be explained by learning-by-doing technology, worker relocation, or growing political support
from exporters. A distinct approach to modeling gradual trade liberalization is taken by Bond
and Park (1998), who show that a form of gradualism can also arise in stationary environments
when countries are asymmetric.
69Indeed, as described in a League of Nations (1942) report, there were many failed multilateral
attempts during the 1920’s and 1930’s to reverse the rising levels of protection and achieve a
cooperative trade-policy relationship.
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Putting aside the issue of coordination, however, there remains the further theoret-
ical question of whether GATT’s multilateral enforcement mechanism facilitates
greater cooperation than would occur were instead cooperation achieved through
a web of bilateral agreements. The question is addressed by Maggi (1999), whose
work we now describe.
Maggi (1999) identifies two broad categories of gains from a multilateral en-
forcement mechanism over a collection of bilateral agreements. The first gain
arises in the presence of local “imbalances of power,” defined as a situation in
which diﬀerent governments stand to lose diﬀerent amounts from a trade war,
with the more “powerful” governments standing to lose less. In such a circum-
stance, the exchange of enforcement power that can be aﬀected under a multilat-
eral dispute settlement procedure can serve to support lower tariﬀs than would be
possible under purely bilateral procedures. Specifically, in a multilateral enforce-
ment mechanism, each country can serve as a third-party enforcer of low tariﬀs in
bilateral relationships where it is “strong” in exchange for receiving third-party
enforcement from others in bilateral relationships where it is “weak.” Purely bi-
lateral enforcement mechanisms cannot aﬀect this exchange of enforcement power.
An extreme example illustrates the underlying idea. Suppose that there are
three countries, A, B and C, and think of the three countries as being positioned
at the vertices of a triangle. Suppose further that the preferences and endowments
in the three countries are such that any given country imports a good from the
country to its right and exports a good to the country to its left. Thus, country
A might export a good to country B while having as its only import a good from
country C. Can the governments of these countries use the threat of retaliation
to achieve cooperative (i.e., below-Nash) tariﬀs? If the government of Country B
were to cheat and raise its tariﬀ on the good it imports from Country A, then
the Country-B government would experience a short-term welfare gain. Notice,
though, that the Country-A government is unable, on its own, to retaliate: there is
no good that Country A imports from Country B (and export taxes are ruled out
by assumption). The governments can thus cooperate and achieve greater-than-
Nash welfare only if a multilateral agreement is in place, in which the Country-C
government stands ready to retaliate with a Nash tariﬀ on the good it imports from
Country B, if the government of Country B cheats the government of Country A
in the described manner.
A second kind of gain from multilateral enforcement mechanisms identified by
Maggi (1999) is associated with the aggregation of enforcement power. The key
idea is that tariﬀs levied by diﬀerent governments on the same imported good
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tend to be strategic complements (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1997b, for an initial
statement of this property). Intuitively, when two countries import the same
good, if the government of one country raises its import tariﬀ, then a greater
volume of the good is diverted to the other country, whose government thus has
an increased incentive to increase its own import tariﬀ and enjoy the associated
terms-of-trade gains. As a consequence of this property, a multilateral enforcement
mechanism which has many governments joining in the punishments can lead
to proportionately more severe punishments than would be forthcoming under
bilateral enforcement procedures.
When either local imbalances of power or strategic tariﬀ complementarity ef-
fects are present, Maggi (1999) shows that a multilateral dispute settlement pro-
cedure is necessary to achieve the gains from exchange and aggregation of en-
forcement power. This perspective of GATT suggests that the monitoring and
information dissemination eﬀects of the dispute settlement procedure represent a
key ingredient in facilitating greater cooperation from multilateral trade agree-
ments. This suggestion is directly consistent with the creation through the WTO
of a Trade Policy Review Mechanism. As we discuss in Section 3.2.3, this rep-
resents a process through which the WTO gathers and disseminates information
concerning the trade policies of its member governments. The “transparency” so
implied enables governments to monitor each other’s compliance with previous
agreements, permitting in turn a level of cooperation that may exceed that which
would occur in the absence of such a multilateral institution.70
7. Conclusion
We describe recent work on the theory of trade agreements that speaks to the
purpose and design of GATT. Our discussion unfolds in three steps. First, we
examine the purpose of a trade agreement. In both the traditional economic and
the political-economy approaches to the study of trade agreements, the problem
70Renato Ruggiero (1995), the current Director-General of the WTO, explains further: “For
all countries, new and detailed obligations have been created to notify policies and measures,
so that trading partners can be confident that they have full knowledge of each other’s policies.
Transparency is an essential ingredient for fostering mutual trust and encouraging respect for the
rules. Indeed, one of the results of the Uruguay Round was the creation of a trade policy review
mechanism, whereby the trade policies of individual WTO members are examined multilaterally
by turn, and in depth. These examinations provide an opportunity for countries to hold frank
and non-litigious exchanges of views about each other’s policies. They are a valuable contribution
to transparency, and help to raise awareness among trading partners of policy issues.”
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for a trade agreement to solve is the excessive protection that arises in the absence
of an agreement as a consequence of the terms-of-trade externality. Second, we
consider the origin and design of GATT. We note that GATT is a rules-based
institution whose origin can be traced to the disastrous economic performance
that accompanied the high tariﬀs of the 1920’s and 1930’s. Finally, we review the
theoretical literature that interprets and evaluates the institutional features found
in GATT. We consider in particular whether GATT articles can be interpreted as
oﬀering negotiation rules that help governments undo the ineﬃcient restrictions
in trade that are caused by the terms-of-trade externality.
On the whole, our review suggests that the core principles of GATT indeed
may be interpreted in this manner. Specifically, we report findings that indicate
that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert to rem-
edy the ineﬃciency created by the terms-of-trade externality. We also extract a
variety of predictions from the literature on enforcement and trade policy, and
we argue that these predictions are broadly compatible with both the design of
GATT and certain historical experiences in trade-policy conduct. We thus in-
terpret the literature reviewed here as providing a strong presumption for the
view that GATT can be understood as an institution whose central principles
are well-designed to assist governments in their attempt to escape from a terms-
of-trade-driven Prisoners’ Dilemma. Our review therefore oﬀers support for the
(politically-augmented) terms-of-trade theory as an appropriate framework within
which to interpret and evaluate GATT.
There are at least three important topics that warrant further discussion.
First, as we mention in Section 2.1.3, many economists are skeptical as to the
practical relevance of terms-of-trade considerations for actual trade-policy negoti-
ations. Below, we consider the objections in greater detail. Second, as we mention
in the Introduction, an important issue concerns the possible application of GATT
principles to the new trade-policy issues that currently confront the WTO. We
touch briefly below on some conclusions that come from recent research on this is-
sue. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of three important directions
for future research.
The Practical Relevance of Terms-of-Trade Considerations What ex-
plains the skepticism that many economists hold with respect to the terms-of-
trade approach to trade agreements? This skepticism seems to derive from three
main objections.
The first objection concerns the inherent plausibility of the terms-of-trade
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argument. As we discuss in Section 2.1.3, the traditional presentation of the terms-
of-trade argument for trade intervention involves a large and national-income-
maximizing government that uses its tariﬀ to manipulate the world price and
thereby assure that in the commercial trade across nations its exports command
a greater volume of imports. Stated this way, the argument certainly sounds
implausible. Relatedly, the plausibility of the theory may be questioned, in light
of the fact that terms-of-trade considerations rarely receive explicit mention in
actual trade-policy negotiations.
As we emphasize in Section 2.1.3, however, the terms-of-trade argument is
more plausible than the traditional presentation might suggest. First, the essen-
tial argument is that ineﬃcient unilateral tariﬀs arise, because governments are
tempted to shift the costs of their intervention onto one another. At a broad
level, then, negotiators reason in a manner consistent with the terms-of-trade the-
ory if they are cognizant of the temptation to shift costs onto one another. And
more specifically, if a partial-equilibrium perspective is taken, such cost-shifting
clearly occurs provided only that some of the incidence of a government’s tariﬀ is
borne by foreign exporters (i.e., the full tariﬀ is not passed through to domestic
consumers). When such cost-shifting does occur, it is plausible to expect that
governments distort their policy choices, as they do not bear the whole cost of
their decisions, and a role for a trade agreement is thus created.71 Second, while
it is true that trade-policy negotiators rarely mention the terms of trade, they do
emphasize the market-access consequences of a trading partner’s tariﬀs. As we
argue in some detail in Section 2.1.3, when a foreign trading partner raises its
tariﬀ, the loss in market access that home-country exporters experience is simply
the “quantity eﬀect” that accompanies the “price eﬀect” of a deterioration in the
home country’s terms of trade.
A second objection questions the consistency of the main predictions of the
terms-of-trade model with observed tariﬀ patterns. For example, it is sometimes
argued that the terms-of-trade theory is inconsistent with observed patterns, be-
cause small countries often have high tariﬀs. Likewise, it is sometime argued that
the theory is inconsistent with the trade-policy choices of large countries (such as
71See, for example, Jackson (1997, p. 23) for a discussion of cost-shifting motives and GATT.
He notes: “More subtle is the possibility that a national consensus could explicitly opt for a
choice of policies that would not maximize wealth (in the traditionally measurable sense, at
least), but would give preference to other non-economic goals...It can be argued that when
a nation makes an ‘uneconomic’ choice, it should be prepared to pay the whole cost, and not
pursue policies which have the eﬀect of unloading some of the burdens of that choice one to other
nations. In an interdependent world, paying the whole cost is not often easy to accomplish.”
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the U.S.), who set positive tariﬀs but do not seem to select “optimal tariﬀs.”
But these criticisms are misguided. The traditional terms-of-trade theory of
trade agreements is formalized under the joint hypotheses that governments (i).
are motivated by terms-of-trade considerations, (ii). are not motivated by political
considerations, and (iii). either interact non-cooperatively (optimal tariﬀs) or
cooperate through a trade agreement and reach the eﬃciency frontier (free trade).
Yet the first hypothesis need not be bundled with the others. Thus, a small
country may set high tariﬀs because its government is politically motivated to
redistribute income to its import-competing sector. And large countries may form
a trade agreement and select low tariﬀs, precisely because they want to avoid the
high (optimal) tariﬀs that would otherwise arise. Their cooperative tariﬀs may
stop short of free trade, though, because of either enforcement diﬃculties that
prevent perfect cooperation or political motivations that place free trade oﬀ of the
eﬃciency frontier. Finally, we argue throughout that the (politically-augmented)
terms-of-trade theory provides a framework that yields implications which, in the
main, are consistent with the observed GATT design and practice.
The third and perhaps most serious objection directly questions the empirical
relevance of the terms-of-trade theory. Are governments in fact able to improve
their terms of trade with their trade-policy choices? And, if so, can they do so
in a quantitatively significant fashion? These questions certainly warrant further
empirical analysis. But strong aﬃrmative presumptions already can be drawn
from existing empirical work, as we now explain.
The hypothesis that governments can improve their terms of trade with their
tariﬀ choices is supported if a reduction in the domestic tariﬀ is not fully passed
through as a reduced price for domestic consumers. It is therefore relevant to refer
to the study of GATT negotiations by Kreinin (1961, p. 314), who finds that:
“less than a third...of the tariﬀ concessions granted by the United States were passed
on to the U.S. consumer in the form of reduced import prices, while more than two-
thirds...accrued to the foreign suppliers and improved the terms of trade of the exporting
nations.”72
Kreinin’s study provides rather direct evidence that the eﬀects of one country’s
tariﬀ policy extend across national borders. In this regard, it is also relevant
to note that a large empirical literature exists that documents imperfect-pass-
through of exchange rate shocks. Presumably, if the cost increase to foreign
72See also Winters and Chang (1997) for a study which finds substantial terms-of-trade eﬀects
associated with regional liberalization.
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exporters takes the form of a tariﬀ increase as opposed to an exchange rate shock,
then imperfect pass through would once again occur, confirming that some of the
incidence of the import tariﬀ is borne by foreign exporters. Empirical support for
this presumption is oﬀered by Feenstra (1995).73
Next, empirical studies by Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1999) strongly support the hypothesis that the terms-of-trade eﬀects of trade-
policy choices can influence the national cost of intervention in quantitatively
important ways. In both studies, evidence is presented indicating that the terms-
of-trade implications of the U.S. decision in the 1980’s to restrict automobile
imports from Japan with VER’s (rather than tariﬀs) increased substantially the
cost to the U.S. of achieving the reduced import volumes. The study by Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes is of particular significance. They compare the actual VER
policy with a hypothetical equivalent-tariﬀ policy, calculating that the equivalent-
tariﬀ policy would have yielded revenue suﬃcient to turn what was a losing trade
policy in terms of U.S. national income into a policy that would have generated
a net gain to the U.S. national income of $12.5 billion. The study is relevant for
the arguments developed in this review, since the only diﬀerence between the two
policies is that they generate distinct world prices. The role of world prices in
determining the incidence of the costs of intervention across trading partners lies
at the core of the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements.74
On the basis of these observations, we conclude that a broad skepticism con-
cerning the empirical relevance of the (politically augmented) terms-of-trade model
73In this context, it also should be emphasized that even seemingly “small” countries may be
able to impose some tariﬀ incidence on foregein exporters. First, the analysis of Gros (1987)
suggests that truly small countries may be diﬃcult to find in practice, as even apparently small
countries have some power over the terms of trade, provided that the industry is monopolistically
competitive. Second, transportation costs encourage greater trade between proximate countries,
and even between seemingly small countries some of the incidence of an import tariﬀ can be
passed onto exporters. As an example, we note that Mexico brought a WTO case against
Guatemala, whose government imposed an 89% tariﬀ on imports of Mexican cement (see, for
example, Tuckman, 1997). Apparently, in the context of the market for cement, Mexico does
not regard the neighboring Guatemala as a small country.
74It may be tempting to infer that the decision of the U.S. to “give away” such an amount
indicates that governments in fact do not care about the terms of trade, even when the associated
implications for income are large. This inference, however, does not follow from the U.S. VER
experience. In particular, as Low (1993, p. 114) emphasizes, the relevant policy alternative for
the U.S. was not a set of unilateral tariﬀ increases (corresponding to the equivalent-tariﬀ policy
above), which surely would have incited a retaliatory “trade war” with Japan, but rather a set
of tariﬀ changes from the U.S. and Japan that were consistent with GATT rules.
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for the study of trade agreements is unwarranted. This is not to say, however,
that other approaches to the study of trade agreements are unimportant. A more
complete understanding of the role of trade agreements will undoubtedly rely on
elements of various approaches. For example, the terms-of-trade theory can easily
account for why truly “small” countries would wish to join GATT (they value the
market access to large trading partners that MFN treatment assures), but this
theory has more diﬃculty explaining why such countries might also bind tariﬀs
on products where they are world-price takers (and hence are incapable of impos-
ing international externalities with their unilateral decisions). The commitment
approach surveyed in Section 2.1.4 could readily provide an explanation for such
behavior.75 Also perplexing from the perspective of the terms-of-trade theory
is GATT’s treatment of export subsidies (export subsidies are restrained under
GATT’s rules, yet they would seem to encourage trade, which the terms-of-trade
theory suggests is GATT’s fundamental purpose), and perhaps the commitment
approach (or some other approach) can help to provide a more complete under-
standing of this important issue.76 These and other puzzles might best be solved
by looking beyond terms-of-trade considerations. But the literature reviewed
above suggests strongly that the (politically augmented) terms-of-trade theory
must be the centerpiece of a coherent theory of GATT.
New Trade-Policy Issues Our review has of necessity maintained a tight focus
on a literature which speaks to core features of GATT’s architecture: reciprocity,
non-discrimination and enforcement. We argue that these are the central princi-
ples on which post-war multilateral liberalization has been based. But a critical
question is whether these same principles can or should be applied to the host of
new trade-policy issues increasingly confronted by the WTO. It is therefore im-
portant to note that recent research has begun to answer this question from the
perspective of the (politically augmented) terms-of-trade approach. We mention
here two strands of this research.
We first mention a literature which attempts to evaluate the potential impli-
cations of preferential trading agreements for the multilateral trading system.77
As we observe above in Section 3.2.2, preferential trading agreements, which take
75More broadly, some empirical evidence of GATT’s ability to help governments make domes-
tic commitments is provided in Staiger and Tabellini (1999).
76For some recent papers which attempt to shed light on the way in which export subsidies are
treated in trade agreements, see Bagwell and Staiger (1997c, 2000b) and Collie (forthcoming).
77See, for example, Anderson and Blackhurst (1993), Baldwin and Venables (1995), Bond and
Syropoulos (1996), Bond, Syropoulos andWinters (1996), Winters (1996), Bhagwati, Greenaway
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the form of free-trade areas or customs unions, are permitted under GATT Ar-
ticle XXIV as an important exception to the principle of non-discrimination. In
recent years, preferential trading agreements have grown in number and signif-
icance. From the perspective of our review here, two questions seem especially
relevant. First, do preferential trading agreements compromise the eﬀectiveness
with which the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can deliver eﬃ-
cient outcomes? Second, when GATT members are involved in preferential trad-
ing agreements, does the enforcement of multilateral trading agreements become
harder or easier? This literature answers the first question in the aﬃrmative, while
it provides an ambiguous answer to the second question. At a general level, the
(politically augmented) terms-of-trade approach thus suggests that preferential
trading agreements may pose a threat to the existing multilateral trading system.
Second, we mention a literature which raises the issue of labor and environmen-
tal standards.78 Existing GATT rules speak to this issue only to the extent that
market access concerns are directly involved, as when one GATT member raises
discriminatory tariﬀs against the exports of a second GATT member in response
to the weak labor standards of the second member, or when a GATT member
adopts a new environmental standard that has the eﬀect of reducing access to its
markets that another GATT member had previously negotiated. The national
labor and environmental standards that member governments choose to adopt
have never been the subject of direct GATT negotiations, but there is mounting
pressure for this to change under the WTO. A number of industrialized countries
(with the U.S. taking a leading position) have recently advocated the adoption of a
“social clause,” in which a set of minimum international standards would be nego-
tiated and then enforced with the threat of trade sanctions. From the perspective
of our review, two central questions are suggested. First, is GATT’s traditional
preoccupation with market access misplaced when the issue of labor and envi-
ronmental standards is raised? And second, should GATT’s limited enforcement
ability be utilized to ensure that national labor and environmental standards are
set in an appropriate fashion? This literature identifies conditions under which the
answer to the first question is “No” and the answer to the second is, with some
qualifications, “Yes.” The broader suggestion from the (politically augmented)
terms-of-trade approach is that GATT principles are potentially well-equipped to
and Panagariya (1998), Ethier (1998a, 1998b, 2000), Bagwell and Staiger (1998, 1999a, 2000a)
and Freund (forthcoming).
78See, for example, Srinivasan (1996), Brown, Deardorﬀ and Stern (1996), Anderson (1998),
Ederington (2000), Spagnolo (2000), Limao (2000) and Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming).
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handle the issue of labor and environmental standards.
Future Directions We conclude by pointing to three promising directions in
which future research might proceed. First, an open question concerns the ex-
tent to which GATT rules also serve to help governments correct additional in-
eﬃciencies (i.e., beyond the terms-of-trade externality) that are associated with
unilateral trade-policy decisions. For example, as we discuss at several points, the
unilateral trade-policy decisions of governments may be ineﬃcient if governments
face a commitment problem with respect to their private sectors. Alternatively,
domestic distortions, such as those associated with monopoly pricing power in
the product market or frictions in the labor market, can introduce new avenues
through which unilateral trade-policy decisions transmit externalities to trading
partners. A related possibility is that Keynesian rigidities may lead to unemploy-
ment, in which case tariﬀ choices may serve to shift unemployment levels across
trading partners. Whether or not GATT rules serve eﬀectively to deal with these
additional sources of ineﬃciency is an important topic for future research.
Second, it is important to consider further whether GATT’s principles con-
stitute an eﬀective approach to the host of new trade-policy issues with which
the multilateral trading system must contend. We discuss this topic above in the
context of some particular new trade-policy issues, but there are many other new
issues that also warrant attention. For example, interesting future work might
consider the performance of GATT’s principles when applied to the treatment of
services, intellectual property rights and trade-related investment measures. Ex-
tensions of this nature are of particular importance as the scope of GATT (and
now the WTO) extends beyond the traditional arena of tariﬀ liberalization.79
Finally, while the government welfare function that we have employed through-
out is quite general, it does not capture all of the concerns that governments may
wish to address through a trade agreement. We have assumed that government
preferences are captured as a general function of local and world prices, but other
concerns, such as military security and political stability, are also of obvious im-
portance, and particularly so in the context of regional integration initiatives.80
The interaction between trade agreements and such broader objectives represents
an interesting and challenging direction for future research.
79For further discussion on the appropriate treatment of new trade-policy issues, see Hoekman
and Kostecki (1995), Jackson (1997, p. 305-18), Trebilcock and House (1999), and articles in
the volumes edited by Stern (1993) and Krueger (1998).
80See Fernandez and Portes (1998) for further discussion along these lines.
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